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JUSTICIABLE GENERALIZED GRIEVANCES
KIMBERLY N. BROWN*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s prevailing test for Article III standing—
injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability—generally restricts suits
to remedy injuries affecting broad segments of the public in substantially equal measure. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court
appeared to depart from this proposition in holding that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has standing to sue the EPA to prompt
it to slow global warming, a harm that affects everyone on Earth.
The dissenting Justices assailed the majority for finding justiciable a
so-called “generalized grievance” in contravention of prior standing
precedent that is based on the notion that if parties seek to redress
public harms, they must do so via the political branches and not the
courts.
Scholarly reflections on the case have addressed the Court’s idiosyncratic anointing of Massachusetts with something it called “special solicitude” in standing analysis, occasioned by its status as a
state. In this Article, I discuss a more subtle aspect of Massachusetts: how the majority wrestled with the controversial injury-in-fact
test, which is ill-suited for analyzing standing in public law disputes. Implicit in Massachusetts is a paradigm for resolving statutory enforcement cases brought to vindicate public harms
indistinguishably suffered by the masses. It is animated by three
characteristics: (1) the plaintiff’s invocation of “procedural rights”
established by statute; (2) a “concrete” and “personal” stake that distinguishes the plaintiff from the pure ideologue; and (3) a congressional authorization of the suit. I suggest that the Court should
draw upon this reconceptualized framework in future statutory enforcement cases, as it offers several advantages for suits brought to
remedy commonly-shared public harms. First, it is more attuned to
the realities of public law litigation. Next, it is based on premises
that a majority of the current Justices—including an architect of
modern injury-in-fact, Justice Scalia—already embrace. Moreover, it
cabins the muddied generalized grievance bar to its original purCopyright  2008 by Kimberly N. Brown.
* Visiting Professor of Law, George Washington University School of Law. B.A., Cornell University; J.D., University of Michigan. Thanks to Scott Dodson, Theresa Gabaldon,
Steve Gensler, Michele Gilman, Amanda Leiter, Bradford Mank, Peter Raven-Hansen,
Liesa Richter, Michael Scaperlanda, Art Wilmarth, and Steve Satterfield for their helpful
comments on earlier versions of this article.
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pose—preventing citizens from suing on purely ideological grounds.
Furthermore, it gives appropriate weight to congressional judgments
about required procedure. Finally, it enforces formal separation of
the executive and judicial branches while recognizing that the separation of powers operates to ensure executive accountability through
judicial review.
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INTRODUCTION
Al Gore may not have acceded to the Presidency. But he has succeeded in raising awareness about the threat of global warming to the
point where it is widely viewed as the environmental crisis of our time,
and one of epic proportions. That it took an Academy Award winning
film to put this problem on the national radar only underscores the
concern that the democratically elected branches of government are
not responding quickly enough to the imminent and potentially catastrophic dangers of climate change.
Typically, there is not much that an ordinary citizen can do—
other than wage a public relations effort—to speed up the political
process. It is often difficult to trigger an environmental response to
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global warming from responsible agencies by suing the government in
federal court even if Congress authorized such a suit. Why? Because
under well-established principles of constitutional standing doctrine,
only a plaintiff with impending, individualized injury-in-fact can invoke the power of Article III courts to redress what must be a personalized complaint. The plaintiff must also trace that injury to the
challenged government action and demonstrate that, if the court
rules against the government, the injury will likely be redressed.
Global warming harms everyone in general, but no one in particular. Nor have its harms been clearly manifested quite yet. And given
the myriad theories about the sources of global warming, and the numerous governmental, corporate, and individual actors on the international stage that contribute to it, tracing the harms of global
warming to the U.S. government is an exercise in conjecture. A suit
against the executive branch for failing to remedy climate change is,
therefore, the quintessential case that one might expect to be condemned as a “generalized grievance” that can only be addressed—if at
all—by the political branches of our tripartite system of government.
This is one reason why the Supreme Court of the United States’s
5-4 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA1 was a stunner. The Court found
that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had standing to bring a
claim against the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to compel its regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new automobiles.2
Translated, the Court told the Bush Administration to do something
about global warming.3 It also found that the judiciary has the power
to hear a case brought to remedy a harm affecting the entire world
populace: the warming of the planet itself.4
Massachusetts has attracted substantial scholarly attention, with
some focus on the Court’s striking endowment of states with “special
solicitude” in constitutional standing analysis.5 Because of this special
1. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
2. Id. at 1458.
3. See Robert Barnes & Juliet Eilperin, High Court Faults EPA Inaction on Emissions; Critics of Bush Stance on Warming Claim Victory, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2007, at A1 (characterizing
the decision as a rebuke of the Bush Administration’s global warming policy).
4. See Robert V. Percival, Massachusetts v. EPA: Escaping the Common Law’s Growing
Shadow, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 127 (observing that the Court held in Massachusetts “that
the harm projected from global warming and climate change gives Massachusetts standing
to sue even if the harm is widely shared and EPA can do little to alleviate most of it”).
5. 127 S. Ct. at 1454–55. See generally Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Future Generations: Does Massachusetts v. EPA Open Standing for Generations to Come?, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. (forthcoming 2009) (positing that states have a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting
future citizens); Percival, supra note 4, at 128–29 (discussing Massachusetts’ application of
special solicitude for state standing); Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Mas-
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solicitude caveat, Massachusetts v. EPA could be read quite narrowly, as
merely enhancing states’ ability to sue to vindicate public harms.
In this Article, I suggest that the Massachusetts Court’s handling of
core constitutional standing doctrine—especially its treatment of particularized injury-in-fact and the concomitant ban on generalized
grievances—has broad implications for justiciability analysis in the
long run.6 The Massachusetts Court flexibly construed what I call “the
adjectives” that clutter the prevailing test, while marking an alternative
paradigm for standing in statutory suits brought to vindicate diffuse
and undifferentiated public harms.
In Part I, I discuss two competing Supreme Court decisions—Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife7 and FEC v. Akins8—that illustrate the unpredictability and incoherence that the prevailing test produces in public
law cases. I then put that conflict in historical context by tracing the
evolution of the current test, its private law underpinnings, and the
uncertain contours of the Court’s constitutional distaste for generalized grievances. Whereas the classic generalized grievance bar forbids ideologues from seeking to enforce the Constitution based solely
on their citizen or taxpayer status, the Court has used it as proxy for
the constitutional requirement of particularized injury-in-fact. As a result, whether the generalized grievance prohibition is a prudential or
constitutional limitation on standing is muddled. At the same time,
the Court has both upheld and rejected Congress’s authority to legislate standing despite undifferentiated injury on the part of the plaintiff, rendering equivocal the nature of the constitutional standing
inquiry itself in public law cases.
In Part II, I discuss the Massachusetts Court’s handling of the
three-part standing inquiry, and suggest that Akins informed the
Court’s analysis of injury-in-fact in a number of important ways. Although a majority of the Court did find that Massachusetts suffered a
particularized injury, the Court supported its hotly contested application of the injury-in-fact test by (1) declaring it significant that Congress authorized the action before it, (2) condoning the generic
“concrete stake” standard of injury, most prominently articulated in
sachusetts v. EPA, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 1 (2007) (discussing the concept of special solicitude as recognized in Massachusetts); infra notes 156–160 and accompanying text.
6. Cf. Percival, supra note 4, at 134 (observing that “while the majority’s discussion of
standing plausibly can be interpreted as relying on a special rule of standing for states, it is
better understood as holding that the state would have standing without the need for any
special rule”).
7. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
8. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
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1962 in Baker v. Carr,9 and (3) highlighting the procedural nature of
the injury at issue.
In Part III, I promote a revised paradigm for analyzing standing
in statutory enforcement cases that can be derived from the foregoing
aspects of the Massachusetts decision. I then describe its advantages
over the injury-in-fact test. Unlike the injury-in-fact standard, my proposed framework expressly attempts to account for the realities of administrative bureaucracy. Its components are uncontroversial and
largely accepted by the sitting Justices. Moreover, it clears up confusion regarding the scope and applicability of the generalized grievance bar in statutory enforcement cases, and brings honesty and
coherence to standing issues that are currently shrouded by empty,
formalistic nods to a broken standard. The proposed framework gives
appropriate deference to legislative procedural requirements and fulfills a purpose of the separation of powers that is distinct from the
preservation of executive autonomy, namely, ensuring executive accountability. Standing jurisprudence that enforces formal separation
of the executive from the judiciary, while recognizing Congress’s occasional adjustment of that relationship to ensure executive adherence
to the rule of law, offers a more balanced approach than the leading
test provides in public law cases.
I. THE ENDURING CONUNDRUM

OF

STANDING

IN

PUBLIC LAW CASES

Under the Supreme Court’s current standing formulation, the
heart of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement10 resides in the
judicial mandate that “[t]he plaintiff . . . show that he ‘has sustained
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as the
result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of
injury must be both ‘real and immediate,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”11 It is fair to say that, in the view of many, the standard is
utterly bankrupt. It has enabled the Supreme Court to produce contradictory rulings on competing constitutional and prudential theo-

9. 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
10. Article III delineates the scope of the term “judicial Power,” which vests in the
lower courts if Congress so determines. That provision states in pertinent part that “[t]he
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States” and to various “Controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
Article III’s references to “cases” and “controversies” have morphed into the judicially created and highly complex doctrine of standing.
11. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983) (citation omitted).
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ries, leaving the standing doctrine hopelessly incoherent and subject
to manipulation.12
The injury-in-fact test set forth in Lujan is especially ill-suited to
identifying justiciable cases in the public law context.13 Plaintiffs seeking to remedy injuries that are widely inflicted by the government may
have a difficult time satisfying “the adjectives,” that is, demonstrating
that their injury is (a) particularized, (b) imminent, and (c) likely to
be redressed by a favorable ruling. As a result, such claims are susceptible to challenge as non-justiciable “generalized grievances”14 regarding the generic exercise of federal authority. The leading case in this
area, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,15 condemned an environmental
claim as a generalized grievance because it did not satisfy the adjectives.16 As I argued in a prior work, the Court’s unarticulated failure
to adhere to Lujan in FEC v. Akins17 has caused substantial confusion,
despite attempts to confine Akins to its facts.18
In this Part, I again describe these dueling precedents as a prelude to an analysis of whether—and if so, how—Massachusetts reconciles them. I also provide a broader historical and theoretical context
for public law standing as a backdrop for the revised framework that I
later glean from Massachusetts. The key difference between Lujan and
Akins centers on the question of whether the harm suffered by a plaintiff must be particularized—that is personalized, unique, or differenti12. See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82
B.U. L. REV. 301, 304, 309–22 (2002) (arguing that “as a body of law, the standing doctrine
has failed” and detailing the inconsistencies in the law); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing
Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1766–67 (1999) (arguing that the Court created
standing doctrine out of “whole cloth” and that there is precedent to support “virtually any
conceivable version of standing law”); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of
Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1450 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Standing and Privatization] (characterizing the injury-in-fact test to determine standing as “quite malleable”).
13. By public law, I mean the rights of citizenship as manifested in suits against the
government. John Bell explains:
In public law, the core function of law is distinctive from private law. Public law is
about defining and controlling the powers and activities of government. This is
not the function of private law, which exists to provide frameworks within which
individuals can undertake voluntarily, and to provide remedies when they exceed
the bounds of the acceptable use of private power.
John Bell, Comparing Public Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 235, 236 (Andrew Harding & Esin Örücü eds., 2002). For a discussion of the differences between the
public law case and private litigation, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282–84, 1302 (1976).
14. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998).
15. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
16. Id. at 562, 573–74.
17. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
18. See generally Kimberly N. Brown, What’s Left Standing? FECA Citizen Suits and the Battle
for Judicial Review, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 677, 679–94 (2007) (comparing Lujan and Akins).
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ated—in contrast with that of broader segments of the public. While
Lujan implied an affirmative answer to this question,19 Akins held that
harms need not be differentiated so long as they are “concrete” and
not “abstract.”20 Because the particularization element of the prevailing injury-in-fact test has been conflated with the generalized grievance bar, the Court has wavered on whether the bar is constitutional
or prudential in the first instance.21 Moreover, as Massachusetts indicates, ambiguity over the scope of the generalized grievance ban has
encouraged litigants to invoke it simply because a public law case involves widespread harm.22 As shown below, the Court’s analysis in
Massachusetts reveals that the existence of generalized harm does not,
and should not, automatically bar members of the public from bringing claims against federal agencies based on statutory enforcement
regimes.
A. Dueling Precedents
The following hypothetical is offered to illustrate public law
standing’s state of disarray.23 Imagine that Bear Friends, an environmental group that studies and disseminates information regarding
grizzly bears, sues the Secretary of the Interior under the Endangered
Species Act (“ESA”)24 over a decision to increase cattle population on
federal grazing lands. The group claims that the Secretary failed to
consult the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) before taking action
that might jeopardize grizzlies, and that the FWS failed to prepare a
requisite biological opinion in accordance with the ESA.25 The ESA
19. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74.
20. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24.
21. See id. at 23 (“Whether styled as a constitutional or prudential limit on standing, the
Court has sometimes determined that where large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the
political process, rather than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance.”) (citations omitted).
22. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007) (rejecting EPA’s claim that
“because greenhouse gas emissions inflict widespread harm, the doctrine of standing
presents an insuperable jurisdictional obstacle”).
23. The author is indebted to Professors Funk, Shapiro, and Weaver for the contours
of this hypothetical. See WILLIAM F. FUNK, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, & RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 435 (3d ed. 2006) and accompanying Teacher’s Manual at 85–87.
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006).
25. The ESA requires the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate regulations listing
species that are “threatened” or “endangered” under certain criteria, and requires each
federal agency to “insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such
agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize” such species. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1536(a)(2) (2006).
If an agency determines that species might be affected, it must formally consult with the
FWS in accordance with 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (2007), which must provide a detailed state-
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allows “any person . . . to enjoin . . . the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be in
violation of any provision of this chapter.”26
Lujan poses obstacles to the hypothetical plaintiff’s standing despite the ESA’s broad language enabling suit. In Lujan, a six-Justice
majority found that environmental groups failed to establish the requisite injury to challenge a Department of the Interior regulation exempting overseas activities from the ESA’s consultation
requirement.27 The plaintiffs alleged that the lack of consultation increased endangered species’ extinction rates and injured their aesthetic interests.28 The Court rejected the claim as raising only a
generalized grievance, explaining that plaintiffs who allege harm to
“every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and
laws” present no case or controversy, as they “seek[ ] relief that no
more directly and tangibly benefits [them] than it does the public at
large.”29 The ESA’s expansive citizen-suit provision did not alter the
analysis, as the Court declared Congress powerless to legislatively
transform a commonly shared harm into an individualized one.30 In
all cases, plaintiffs must satisfy the strictures of injury-in-fact, which,
under Lujan, means personalized or differentiated harm that is distinct from that suffered by the next person.31

ment (a biological opinion) setting forth how a proposed agency action is likely to affect a
threatened or endangered species and its habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2006).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A).
27. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 556, 562–63 (1992). Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s opinion with respect to the plaintiffs’ failure to show injury-in-fact. Id. at 556, 571–78. Justices
Kennedy and Souter did not join Justice Scalia’s analysis of redressability. Id. at 556,
568–71; see also id. at 579–80 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Stevens filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment because he was not persuaded that the ESA’s consultation
requirement applied to activities in foreign countries, but disagreed “that respondents lack
standing because the threatened injury to their interest in protecting the environment and
studying endangered species is not ‘imminent’ [or] ‘redressable’ in this litigation.” Id. at
581–82 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justice O’Connor joined. Id. at 589 (Blackman, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 562–63 (majority opinion).
29. Id. at 573–74.
30. Id. at 576–77.
31. Id. at 573–74. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy opined that Congress does have
the authority “to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a
case or controversy where none existed before,” provided that the relevant statute both
identifies “the injury [Congress] seeks to vindicate” and ties that injury “to the class of
persons entitled to bring suit.” Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Although it was undisputed that the Lujan plaintiffs identified
cognizable aesthetic injury,32 the Court rejected the injury as insufficiently particularized because the plaintiffs had no “specific connection” to the affected species that distinguished their interest in, say,
animal welfare from the public’s generic interest in the lawsuit.33 The
plaintiffs’ ability to differentiate themselves from the broader population hinged on whether they could show that aesthetic harm was imminent. Whereas group members had visited project sites and
asserted “intentions” to return, this did not suffice to show “how damage to the species will produce ‘imminent’ injury to [them].”34 Justice
Blackmun complained in his dissent that the majority’s requirement
of firmer travel plans was “an empty formality” that could be trivially
satisfied “simply [by] purchasing plane tickets.”35
According to a plurality of Justices in Lujan, moreover, it was not
likely that the injury would be redressed because a favorable ruling
would not stop the foreign projects from going forward.36 The Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”) had no direct role in the projects,
and the third party agencies, which would not be bound by a judgment, supplied less than ten percent of the funding.37 It was hence
“entirely conjectural” whether endangered species—and the plaintiffs’ aesthetic injuries—would be helped by an order directing the

32. The Court acknowledged that aesthetic interests give rise to standing. Id. at 562–63
(majority opinion).
33. Id. at 565–68 & n.3; see also id. at 563 (stating that the plaintiff must show that she is
“directly affected apart from [her] special interest in th[e] subject” (quoting Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735, 739 (1972) (internal quotations omitted) (second alteration in
original)).
34. Id. at 564. Although Lujan states that the traceability/redressability criteria are relaxed for certain procedural injuries, see id. at 572 n.7 and infra notes 43–45 and accompanying text, it did not apply that relaxed standard to the facts in Lujan. Thus, I read the
Lujan plurality as requiring a relatively stringent redressability showing, although it must
be emphasized that the Court has been inconsistent regarding this prong of the injury-infact test, as well. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997) (applying a “coercive
effect” standard for redressability); see generally infra note 60 (discussing Bennett). Although
this paper focuses primarily on the injury prong of the Lujan test, it is my contention that
redressability should be relaxed in public law cases more generally. See Brown, supra note
18, at 716–24 (arguing that redressability does not meaningfully distinguish justiciable
cases in the public law context). Although the Massachusetts Court applied a more liberal
redressability analysis than did the Lujan plurality, see infra notes 174–183 and accompanying text, given Justice Scalia’s inability to garner a majority on the issue in Lujan, Massachusetts may present less of a doctrinal shift than meets the eye.
35. 504 U.S. at 592 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 571 (majority opinion).
37. See id. at 568–69, 571 (“AID, for example, has provided less than 10% of the funding for the Mahaweli project.”).
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Secretary to amend the regulation to require that agencies consult
with each other about actions overseas.38
In order to satisfy Lujan’s injury-in-fact analysis, Bear Friends
must produce a member who regularly visits the bear habitat in question and can thereby show that the harm to her aesthetic interests is
“individual” or particularized to her39 in that it is more imminent, at
least, than that alleged by the Lujan plaintiffs. Bear Friends must also
show that a biological opinion by the FWS would likely redress that
aesthetic harm by, for example, making grizzlies safer.
Although Bear Friends may well have standing under the foregoing scenario, it would have problems if it sought to base its standing
on its own study and dissemination of information about grizzly bears.
If those activities do not entail physically interacting with grizzlies on a
regular basis, the government would argue that under Lujan the injury is insufficiently imminent and particularized. Because the particularity requirement has merged with the generalized grievance bar,40
the government may further assert that the complaint boils down to
an impermissible generalized grievance—shared equally by broad segments of the animal-loving population—that the Secretary violated
the ESA’s generic requirements. Bear Friends would counter that its
members have a stake in preserving grizzlies that does not hinge on
imminent proximity to the bears. Justice Blackman argued in Lujan
that “[i]t cannot seriously be contended that a litigant’s failure to use
the precise or exact site where animals are slaughtered or where toxic
waste is dumped into a river means he or she cannot show injury.”41
Its members’ aesthetic interests would be harmed if increased cattle
grazing on public lands brought the bears into greater contact with
humans, thus increasing the risk that bears will be killed. Moreover,
the organization’s own mission of informing the public about grizzlies
is hampered by the lack of information about grizzly bears that would
otherwise be supplied by the biological opinion. These injuries, however, are neither particularized nor imminent under the analysis of
the Lujan majority. If imminence turns on ongoing physical proximity to the bear habitat, Bear Friends’ standing claim fails. Moreover,
the injury is not particularized because the entire populace lacks the
information that would be supplied by the biological opinion, and all
animal lovers (at least) share the aesthetic injury that occurs when
38. Id. at 568, 571.
39. See id. at 560 n.1 (defining “particularized” as an injury that affects the plaintiff “in
a personal and individual way”).
40. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
41. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 594 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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they perceive that grizzlies are jeopardized.42 Nor can Bear Friends
easily argue under Lujan that an order requiring consultation with the
FWS or preparation of a biological opinion will redress its aesthetic
harms, as the Secretary might approve the increased cattle population
even if those procedural steps are taken by the non-party agencies.
The future harm alleged may not even occur, and if it does, it may
ultimately be caused by something else—such as an unexpected spike
in the grizzly population.
To be sure, in its now-famous footnote seven, the Lujan Court
acknowledged that certain public law cases—those involving “‘procedural rights’”—trigger “special” treatment when it comes to standing
analysis.43 In particular, “[t]he person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right
without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.”44 The Court explained:
[O]ne living adjacent to the site for proposed construction
of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency’s failure to prepare an environmental impact
statement, even though he cannot establish with any certainty that the statement will cause the license to be withheld
or altered, and even though the dam will not be completed
for many years.45
This caveat provides only weak support for Bear Friends’ claim
that the Secretary violated the ESA’s procedural requirements, as the
Lujan Court did not clearly differentiate between an interest in making sure that agencies comply with statutorily prescribed procedures—
which it condemned as non-justiciable—and a “procedural right” that
enjoys special Article III treatment.46 The Court’s recognition of a
procedural rights “exception” to the rigors of causation and redressability, moreover, has not gained prominence in subsequent Supreme Court cases analyzing injury-in-fact.47
42. There are other issues at play in this hypothetical, including whether the claim is
ripe and whether Bear Friends could satisfy the standard for associational standing set
forth in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977), but
they are beside the point I am attempting to make here.
43. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 (majority opinion).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 571–73.
47. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Expanding the Zone, Tilting the Field: Zone of Interests and
Article III Standing Analysis After Bennett v. Spear, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 763, 803–04, 811
(1997) (observing that the Court could have resolved Bennett based on Lujan’s footnotes
seven and eight, but instead undertook a detailed analysis of redressability).
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Bear Friends, however, could cite to FEC v. Akins and argue that
its injuries, although not imminent within the meaning of Lujan or
differentiated from other potential plaintiffs, are not constitutionally
barred because they amount to more than a naked claim that the government wrongly failed to comply with the ESA.48 Akins initially had
the potential for greatly disturbing Lujan’s grip on standing theory
and doctrine in public law cases. As Cass Sunstein remarked, “the
Court appears to have held that any citizen has standing to sue under
FECA.”49 A six-Justice majority found that voters had standing to sue
the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) for its failure to obtain campaign information from a third party under the Federal Election Commission Act (“FECA”).50 Like the ESA, the FECA enables “[a]ny party
aggrieved by an order of the Commission . . . [to] file a petition” in
federal district court seeking review.51 The Court acknowledged that
the FEC’s “strongest argument” was “its contention that this lawsuit
involves only a ‘generalized grievance’” because all voters suffered the
informational injury alleged.52 The Court rejected the FEC’s argument, however, observing that “the fact that a political forum may be
more readily available where an injury is widely shared . . . does not, by
itself, automatically disqualify an interest for Article III purposes.”53
The Court also dismissed the contention that “Congress lacks the constitutional power to authorize federal courts to adjudicate this lawsuit.”54 Nominally adhering to Lujan by finding that the lack of
information constituted cognizable injury,55 the Court held that only
those injuries that are “of an abstract and indefinite nature,” such as
“harm to the ‘common concern for obedience to law,’” are barred as
generalized grievances.56 The harm need not be differentiated, in
other words, so long as it is “concrete.”57
48. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19–20 (1998) (finding that respondents satisfied
standing requirements); see generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3, at
71–73 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing Lujan and Akins).
49. Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 616 (1999) [hereinafter Sunstein, Informal Regulation]. See also
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–456 (2006).
50. Akins, 524 U.S. at 13–14. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg joined.
Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices O’Connor and Thomas joined.
See id. at 29 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A).
52. Akins, 524 U.S. at 23.
53. Id. at 23–24.
54. Id. at 20.
55. Id. at 24–25.
56. Id. at 23 (quoting Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 311 U.S. 295, 303 (1940)).
57. Id. at 24.
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Akins would thus enable Bear Friends to argue that the ESA’s authorization of the suit is meaningful for standing purposes, and that
the undifferentiated nature of the harm alleged is irrelevant, so long
as the harm is concrete, which the lack of bear-related information
that would otherwise be provided in a biological opinion is. Although
the Akins plaintiffs sought nothing from the FEC directly, attempting
instead to prompt regulation of someone else who might later make
disclosures, the Court was not troubled by redressability, observing
simply that a reviewing court could “set aside the agency’s action and
remand the case.”58 Bear Friends would therefore argue that its injuries are redressable under Akins even though the FWS is not a party.
Because Akins is not easily squared with Lujan, it has been largely
considered sui generis, confined to voter cases involving requests for
information, and its irreconcilability with Lujan has invited relitigation
of the literal Akins holding even in cases brought under the FECA.59
Bear Friends’ merits suit could similarly wind up stalled by an expensive briefing battle over which Supreme Court cases reign supreme.60
The Court’s standing rulings in statutory enforcement cases, therefore, leave crucial questions unresolved. If Lujan is properly con58. Id. at 25.
59. See Brown, supra note 18, at 694–701, for a discussion of the FEC’s propensity to
relitigate standing issues already decided in Akins.
60. Although the Court has struggled to adhere to Lujan as the standard-bearer in
other public law cases, it has applied Justice Scalia’s articulation of the generalized grievance bar and his construction of the adjectives only selectively. The same year that the
Court issued Akins, Justice Scalia led a majority in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
523 U.S. 83 (1998), to find another statute conferring standing on “any person” unconstitutional as applied. Id. at 85–87, 109; see also 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (2000) (setting forth
the citizen-suit provision that was in question in the Steel case). But in Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000), a majority found that
the “quantum of deterrence” created by a potential award of civil penalties under the
Clean Water Act enabled environmental groups to sue a hazardous waste incinerator facility to enforce the EPA’s permits regulating the discharge of pollutants. Id. at 171, 186. In
dissent, Justice Scalia called the ruling “a lever that will move the world,” id. at 205 (Scalia,
J., dissenting), with “grave implications for democratic governance.” Id. at 202. Yet in
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997), he led a unanimous Court to find that commercial
plaintiffs had standing to bring a citizen suit under the ESA. Id. at 156, 164. The plaintiffs
sought review of the FWS’s biological opinion that a water reservoir project threatened the
existence of certain fish. Id. at 157. They claimed that the FWS’s recommendation to
restrict water delivery reduced the amount of water available to them, thus harming their
“competing interest in the water.” Id. at 160. The Court was unpersuaded that Lujan required a showing that the plaintiffs were particularly injured by receiving less water (versus
a showing that water would be reduced in the aggregate). Id. at 167–68. Nor did it find
redressability lacking. Id. at 170–71. Conceding that the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation—a
non-party—was “free to disregard” the biological opinion in making its final determination
regarding water allocation, the Court tolerated the conjectural nature of possible redress,
reasoning that “in reality” the FWS’s opinion “has a powerful coercive effect on the action
agency.” Id. at 169–70.
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strued to require that injury-in-fact be particularized (that is,
differentiated) by a showing of imminence or otherwise, and that such
injury must be likely—not merely possibly—redressed, are so-called
generalized grievances brought to vindicate a commonly shared public harm linked to government conduct constitutionally impermissible? In analyzing this question, how much, if any, weight should the
courts give to congressional authorizations of standing presented in
these cases? Consideration of these issues requires some historical understanding of the prevailing construction of Article III’s case or controversy requirement.
B.

How Did We Get Here? The Evolution of Standing to Vindicate
Public Harms

The problems with standing in statutory enforcement cases can
be traced to the doctrine’s evolution from a legal system premised on
the adjudication of individual rights, prior to the proliferation of public law. In this Subpart, I retrace familiar ground by summarizing the
evolution of the standing doctrine from its theoretical roots to its present state of confusion to set the stage for the alternative paradigm
that Massachusetts v. EPA offers for standing in public law cases.
1.

Historical Standing, the Rights-Duty Model, and Injury-in-Fact

While the Supreme Court did not analyze legal standing to sue as
a constitutional limitation on jurisdiction until the early part of the
twentieth century,61 English common law courts imposed no threshold standards to identify proper parties to allege a particular violation
of the law.62 The English system was premised on a set of preordained
legal rights that were enforceable even if “a stranger to the official
action” satisfied the criteria for a particular form of writ.63 The Supreme Court borrowed this legal-rights standard, and its fledgling articulations of standing doctrine were tied to the identification of
61. See, e.g., Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922) (dismissing suit challenging
executive compliance with the Constitution because it was “not a case within the meaning
of . . . Article III”); see also RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS
140 (3d ed. 1999) (citing Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 302 (1944)).
62. See MICHAEL L. WELLS ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS 275 (2007).
63. Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological
Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1968); see also F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in
Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 281 (2008) (discussing private versus public right distinction). A petitioner could invoke a writ of quo warranto, for example, to
force a public officer to justify certain behavior without demonstrating actual personal
harm. WELLS ET AL., supra note 62, at 275.
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common law rights held by the “Hohfeldian”64 plaintiff against a party
with a correlative duty—a concept that did not readily accommodate
public rights owed to the collective community.65
With the New Deal’s advent, the rights-duty model began to falter. A progressive Court supportive of New Deal reforms initially adhered to it as a means of insulating regulatory decisions from judicial
interference.66 The objects of new regulation—primarily industrial
corporations—readily gained access to federal court because their
proprietary interests were adversely affected.67 Statutory “beneficiaries,” including workers and consumers for whose benefit and protection the laws were designed, had a more difficult time asserting
violations of rights or duties analogous to common law interests.68
64. Louis Jaffe famously coined a name for the typical common law plaintiff who
“seek[s] a determination that he has a right, a privilege, an immunity or a power.” Jaffe,
supra note 63 at 1033 & n.1 (citing Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913)). Supreme Court Justices
utilized the Hohfeldian label and the rights-duty distinction in the Court’s older standing
jurisprudence. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 203 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (characterizing the plaintiff seeking information from the government as “a traditional Hohfeldian plaintiff”); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119 & n.5, 120 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (deeming taxpayer plaintiffs “non-Hohfeldian” in that they do not seek to enforce personal or proprietary interests of the traditional plaintiff); see also Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972) (citing Professor Jaffe’s article).
65. See Tenn. Elec. Power v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137–38 (1939) (denying
power companies standing to enjoin a competitor from producing electricity because they
did not assert injury to “a legal right—one of property, one arising out of contract, one
protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege”). For some private actions, such as actions for trespass, the plaintiff need only prove
the invasion of a legally protected interest to obtain redress. See Hessick, supra note 63, at
281 (explaining that damage is presumed in trespass actions); see also id. at 284–85 (discussing William Blackstone’s principle that “where there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy . . . whenever that right is invaded” and explaining that, “[b]ased on this rule, early
American courts awarded nominal damages for violations of rights that did not result in
harm” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
66. Sunstein, Standing and Privatization, supra note 12, at 1437–38; see also Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 393, 458–59 (1996) (discussing how Justice Frankfurter “led a rapidly emerging majority of FDR appointees in . . . minimizing judicial interference with the political departments through the justiciability doctrines,” and how this “understandable desire to
promote the New Deal (e.g., by protecting agency autonomy and barring substantive due
process claims) metamorphosed into a hostility toward any constitutional claims, except in
rare cases presenting well-developed complaints of individualized, common law harm”).
67. Sunstein, Standing and Privatization, supra note 12, at 1436.
68. Id. In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936), for example, the
Court held that corporate stockholders had standing to sue a federal agency to invalidate
an allegedly illegal contract entered into with the corporation because they “are not creditors but shareholders . . . and thus they have a proprietary interest in the corporate enterprise which is subject to injury through breaches of trust or duty on the part of the
directors.” Id. at 321. Justice Brandeis wrote a concurrence, in which he clarified that
“[m]ere belief that corporate action . . . is illegal gives the stockholder no greater right to
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As courts increasingly construed statutorily created legal interests
as cognizable,69 however, a concept that Cass Sunstein called “surrogate standing” evolved “by which Congress could allow certain plaintiffs to bring suit to vindicate the claims of the public at large.”70 This
was done, for example, by granting judicial review to any “person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action” under the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”).71
Rather than treating inadequate regulatory action as a “legal
wrong” under the rights-duty model, however, the Court attempted to
simplify standing by developing an entirely different test.72 It moved
toward identifying a litigant’s “personal stake” in the case,73 describing
standing’s primary aim as ensuring the “concrete adversariness” that
facilitates effective judicial decisionmaking.74 The oft-cited 1962 opinion in Baker v. Carr75 married the two concepts: The plaintiff must
“allege[ ] such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.”76 This foundational “concrete adversity” theory justified standing thresholds as a means of promoting

interfere than is possessed by any other citizen,” as “[t]he function of guarding the public
against acts deemed illegal rests with the public officials.” Id. at 343 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
69. See Sunstein, Standing and Privatization, supra note 12, at 1439–42 (citing FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476–77 (1940)).
70. Id. at 1439.
71. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
72. See Sunstein, Standing and Privatization, supra note 12, at 1444–45 (noting that the
Court “replaced the legal interest test with a factual inquiry into the existence of harm”).
73. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972) (stating that to have standing the plaintiff must either have a “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy” or
must “rely on [a] specific statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process”).
74. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 387–88 (3d ed. 2000) (observing that the Court’s main standing concern at the time was to avoid the pronouncement of advisory opinions as a result of hearing overly abstract claims).
75. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
76. Id. at 204. Chief Justice Burger explained this precursor to modern standing doctrine in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217–27 (1974). Concrete injury “is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a
form traditionally capable of judicial resolution.” Id. at 220–21 (emphasis added). It “enables a
complainant authoritatively to present to a court a complete perspective upon the adverse
consequences flowing from the specific set of facts undergirding his grievance.” Id. at 221.
In Schlesinger, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim as a generalized grievance, a concept I
discuss below. Id. at 217, 220; see generally infra Section I.B.2.
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better litigation by ensuring that disputes were properly framed, vigorously argued, and go forward only necessarily.77
In the 1970s, as a need for greater oversight of administrative
agencies was triggered by new legislation aimed at protecting the public (versus the regulated),78 the Court firmly cast aside the rights-duty
model in favor of a more mature articulation of the personal stake
concept: injury-in-fact.79 The test conceivably allowed private parties—including regulatory beneficiaries—to seek redress for broadly
held, quasi-public interests so long as they could show they were individually injured.
Although designed as a means of achieving transparency and predictability,80 the injury-in-fact test has proven structurally infelicitous
77. The idea that standing aims to ensure that a case is adequately adversarial for judicial resolution is rooted in the most basic of the justiciability doctrines: the illusory ban on
advisory opinions. Springing from the common law tradition whereby courts resolved disputes between adversaries, the prohibition on advisory opinions serves the methodological
purpose of ensuring sound judicial decisionmaking. WELLS ET AL., supra note 62, at 246
(noting the common law roots of the prohibition on advisory opinions). The idea is that
judges function best if adversaries sharpen the issues by urging different outcomes in a
circumscribed dispute. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96–97 (1968) (discussing advisory
opinion ban). Two criteria enforce the prohibition on advisory opinions. See generally
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, § 2.2, at 49–54 (discussing the two requisite criteria for a case
to be justiciable and not merely a request for an advisory opinion). Like the standing triad,
the criteria are tied to Article III’s definition of the “judicial Power of the United States” as
encompassing “cases” or “controversies”: (1) an actual dispute between adverse litigants,
see Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356–63 (1911) (holding a claim to be nonjusticiable as the United States possessed no interest adverse to the claimants); and (2) a substantial likelihood that a federal court decision in favor of the claimant will bring about some
change or effect. Cf. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792) (noting that statutory authority to make nonbinding recommendations was “not of a judicial nature” and
would violate the separation of powers because it allowed for revision of court opinions by
another governmental branch). Numerous scholars have disputed the notion that standing achieves the concrete adversity goal. See, e.g., Sunstein, Standing and Privatization, supra
note 12, at 1448 (arguing that the “problem of concreteness has nothing to do with the
question of standing”).
78. See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 292 (1990) (noting that
“the increasing pervasiveness of the administrative agencies” has had a documented effect
on federal jurisdiction).
79. The first opinion to mention what is now known as the injury-in-fact test as a constitutional limit on standing was Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970), in which the Court unanimously applied the injury-in-fact test to
enable judicial review of a decision by the Comptroller of the Currency to allow banks to
provide data processing services to customers. Id. at 152–56. Gene Nichol explains that
“injury in fact seemed ideal since it ensured a personal stake by hinging itself to harm and
separating itself from the claim on the merits because it was not dependent upon interests
created or protected by law.” Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68,
74 (1984) (describing “the Court’s search in Data Processing for an overriding principle . . .
to instruct the threshold standing inquiry”); see also Nichol, supra note 12, at 305–06 (discussing the replacement of the legal rights model with injury-in-fact).
80. Sunstein, Standing and Privatization, supra note 12, at 1449.
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at parsing standing in complex administrative cases implicating numerous third parties or indirect redress. This is partly because, as Cass
Sunstein has observed, there has been “a partial return to a private-law
model of public law.”81 In a famous 1983 law review article, then D.C.
Circuit Judge Scalia opined that Congress lacks the constitutional authority to empower an individual to enforce a public law provision
through the courts because standing doctrine exists, in his view, to
circumscribe federal courts’ role to that of vindicating individual—
not public—rights.82 He later wrote that the case or controversy requirement has “virtually no meaning” except by reference to “the
traditional, fundamental limitations upon the powers of common-law
courts.”83
Justice Scalia’s article fastened this private law theory of justiciability on a single aspect of the separation of powers: the prevention of “an overjudicialization of the process of self-governance.”84 In
other words, certain wrongful government action—such as that which
“affects ‘all who breathe’”—will get its fair consideration, but only “in
the normal political process,” not in the courts.85 The source of his
conclusion was not Article III, but Article II, which establishes the ex-

81. See id. at 1452 (noting that the standing determination has proved particularly difficult in cases in which beneficiaries challenge the government’s regulation of third parties);
see also Bandes, supra note 78, at 279–80 (arguing that the Court’s common law approach
to standing constitutes an “unquestioning endorsement of the private rights model”); id. at
280 (observing that “[t]he Court’s preference for the adjudication of pecuniary and property rights of individuals [still shapes] its standing doctrine, within which widely shared . . .
injuries are devalued unless they can be cast in common law terms”).
82. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 893–94 & n.58 (1983) (arguing that standing “restricts
courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities
against impositions of the majority”). Chief Justice Roberts shares this view. See John G.
Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1229 (1993) (advocating strict adherence to the injury-in-fact test).
83. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 340 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. Scalia, supra note 82, at 881.
85. Id. at 895–96 (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)). Scholars differ regarding the proper role of the
federal courts in enforcing federal law. Compare James Leonard & Joanne C. Brant, The
Half-Open Door: Article III, the Injury-in-Fact Rule, and the Framers’ Plan for Federal Courts of
Limited Jurisdiction, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 89 (2001) (arguing that “the Framers most likely
conceived of the courts as places where federal law was enforced incidental to the resolution of individual disputes”), with Pushaw, supra note 66, at 455 (arguing that “[t]he Court
has neglected the Founders’ idea that federal judges represent the People by remedying
the unlawful conduct of political branch officials in both private and public judicial
actions”).
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ecutive’s constitutional prerogative to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.86
Nearly ten years later, in his landmark opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, Justice Scalia employed his private law theory on behalf
of the Court to reject standing for plaintiffs suffering an injury “that
no more directly and tangibly benefits [them] than it does the public
at large.”87 Lujan posited that widely shared harms are justiciable only
if plaintiffs can demonstrate that they experienced them in a distinctive way; otherwise, their only remedy is to seek relief from the political branches of government.88 Further, the Court pronounced that
Congress cannot alter this so-called generalized grievance bar by authorizing “generalized grievance” suits to vindicate harms indistinguishably incurred by multitudes.89
2. The Generalized Grievance Bar Generally
The generalized grievance bar advanced in Lujan first emerged
in a line of constitutional cases reaching back to the early twentieth
century.90 Historically, generalized grievances took one of two
forms.91 The first, unadorned “citizen-standing,” involved suits premised only upon “the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that
the Government be administered according to law and that the public
moneys be not wasted.”92 For such a plaintiff, there is no identifiable
86. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 3).
87. Id. at 572–74; see also id. at 575 (discussing the holding in United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166 (1974), stating that the “suit rested upon an impermissible ‘generalized grievance’ . . . because ‘the impact on [plaintiff] is plainly undifferentiated and common to all
members of the public’” (alteration in original)).
88. See id. at 574–75 (implying that, if a plaintiff were able to show an injury that was
different from the injury to the public in general, the plaintiff would have standing).
89. Id. at 576–77 (forbidding Congress from authorizing standing to permit citizens
who suffer “no distinctive concrete harm”).
90. Although the generalized grievance bar arose in the context of constitutional cases
brought by taxpayers, the Court has adopted it by reference in cases involving other allegations of harm. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 497–99 (1975) (recognizing the
“generalized grievance” bar in a constitutional challenge to municipal zoning ordinances
which derived from numerous theories of injury, such as an inability to build or acquire
residential property in the area in question) (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221–27 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,
188–97 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Ex parte Lévitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)). The
Court has also adopted the generalized grievance bar in statutory enforcement actions.
See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 575.
91. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, § 2.3.5, at 91–97 (noting that the prohibition against generalized grievances “prevents individuals from suing if their only injury is as
a citizen or a taxpayer concerned with having the government follow the law”).
92. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129–30 (1922).
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individualized injury; there is merely concern over whether the executive branch is adhering to the law. In Fairchild v. Hughes,93 therefore,
the Court rejected “a proceeding to have the Nineteenth Amendment
declared void.”94 Although the Court did not expressly address
whether its ruling’s basis was constitutional or prudential, it observed
that citizens’ general right “to require that the Government be administered according to law” does not entitle them to challenge the generic validity of a constitutional amendment in court.95 Later, in Ex
Parte Lévitt,96 the Court linked citizen standing to a requirement that a
private individual show “that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of [executive or legislative] action,” adding that “it is not sufficient that he has merely a
general interest common to all members of the public.”97 Early cases
establishing the bar on citizen standing, therefore, arguably linked the
concept to both prudential and constitutional principles.98
The second form of generalized grievance was known as “taxpayer standing.” It hinged on the plaintiff’s status as “a taxpayer of
the United States” and the argument “that the effect of the appropriations complained of [is] to increase the burden of future taxation.”99
Conceptually, taxpayer standing is somewhat different than citizen
standing because, for the taxpayer complaining about federal expenditures, there is some financial injury. In Frothingham v. Mellon,100 the
Court rejected taxpayer standing because the plaintiff’s “interest in
the moneys of the Treasury . . . is shared with millions of others; is
comparatively minute and indeterminable; and . . . is essentially a mat93. Id.
94. Id. at 129.
95. Id. at 129–30.
96. 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam).
97. Id. at 634.
98. I do not attempt to resolve here whether the bar on naked claims of citizen standing is prudential or constitutional, except to note that, if one assumes that injury-in-fact is
grounded in Article III, the uninjured citizen plaintiff lacks constitutional standing. This
outcome would not necessarily serve the historical purposes behind standing, however, as
the concrete adversity rationale could theoretically be satisfied by a well-represented plaintiff with ardently held views about the challenged conduct who is fully capable of apprising
the court of the issues. See supra note 77 (discussing scholarship that disputes the notion
that standing serves a concrete adversity goal). If the case or controversy requirement is
properly construed as facilitating the separation of powers, moreover, allowing citizens to
sue over any complaint about the administrative bureaucracy would render the judicial
branch the ultimate supervisor of executive conduct. On that front, as well, the ban on
citizen standing appears to be constitutional, despite the common assumption that the
broader “generalized grievance” bar is prudential.
99. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923).
100. Id.
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ter of public and not of individual concern.”101 Hence, it appears that
the problem with taxpayer standing is that the injury is so “comparatively minute” and unquantifiable that it is essentially no different
than the disquiet with government activity that one associates with citizen standing.102
Accordingly, the generalized grievance bar to taxpayer standing
first emerged as a prudential concern.103 It was a way of keeping a
flood of citizens from bringing into federal court their kitchen sink
complaints about government activity based on generic theories of fiscal responsibility. In Frothingham, the Court explained that “[t]he administration of any statute, likely to produce additional taxation to be
imposed upon a vast number of taxpayers, the extent of whose several
liability is indefinite and constantly changing, is essentially a matter of
public and not of individual concern.”104
Later, in Flast v. Cohen,105 the Court allowed taxpayers to bring a
constitutional claim and adopted a “nexus” test for future cases, raising speculation that it had substantially expanded the availability of
taxpayer standing.106 Flast, however, has since been confined to its
facts,107 rendering it difficult for citizens to successfully sue the government to prompt compliance with constitutional rights that indistinguishably benefit the broader populace. In the process, the Court
has obfuscated the scope and purpose of the generalized grievance
bar by utilizing it to justify the rejection of standing in cases involving
101. Id. at 487; see also Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 433–34 (1952) (rejecting
taxpayer standing in constitutional challenge to New Jersey law authorizing public school
teachers to read Bible passages).
102. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 151 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that for “[t]he simplest application of the concept of ‘standing’ . . . the [plaintiff’s] interest must not be wholly negligible, as that of a taxpayer of the
Federal Government is considered to be”).
103. See TRIBE, supra note 74, at 415 (noting that courts often heed the “prudential policy against the assertion of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed by the
representative branches”); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975) (observing
that the generalized grievance bar is a prudential principle).
104. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487.
105. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
106. Id. at 102. In Flast, taxpayers challenged federal subsidies to parochial schools on
Establishment Clause grounds. Id. at 85. The lower court relied upon Frothingham to dismiss the plaintiffs’ challenge, id. at 88 (citing Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1 (1967)), and
the Supreme Court reversed. Id. The Court enabled taxpayer standing if the plaintiff
satisfied a two-pronged “nexus” test: (1) the plaintiff must show a “logical link between
[taxpayer] status and the type of legislative enactment attacked,” and (2) the “taxpayer
must establish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional
infringement alleged.” Id. at 102.
107. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2568–69 (2007).
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concrete injuries. In United States v. Richardson,108 for example, Chief
Justice Burger wrote an opinion rejecting as too generalized an allegation of injury that was identical to that which the Court later found
justiciable in Akins—the lack of a document that would be useful in
voting.109 The plaintiff did not raise a bald citizen complaint about
the government’s compliance with the Constitution or a de minimis
financial injury divined from his tax obligations. He alleged an informational injury caused by the Secretary of the Treasury’s failure to
publish an accounting of receipts and expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency as required by the Taxing and Spending Clause of
Article I.110 Chief Justice Burger wrote for a slim majority that “[t]his
is surely the kind of a generalized grievance described in both Frothingham and Flast since the impact on him is plainly undifferentiated
and ‘common to all members of the public.’”111 The Court thus
merged the generalized grievance bar with the constitutional requirement of particularized injury, and extended it to plaintiffs with injuries more substantial than those of the ideological citizen or
taxpayer.112
Importantly, moreover, the majority cited a different rationale for
the generalized grievance bar in Richardson: separation of powers. It
did not matter that no better plaintiff existed for standing purposes or
that the question would never be litigated, as “the subject matter is
committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process.”113 In Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc.,114—a
108. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
109. Id. at 167–68, 178. The Court distinguished Flast in part on the grounds that the
Richardson plaintiff’s challenge did not rest on the taxing and spending power. Id. at 175.
110. Id. at 168; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from
time to time.”).
111. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 176–77 (quoting Ex parte Lévitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)).
112. There has been confusion surrounding this issue for years. See Bandes, supra note
78, at 263 n.225 (noting commentators’ observations that the Court blurs abstract and
widely shared injury whereas “the fact that an injury is widely shared does not in itself
render it less particularized” (citing Daniel Patrick Condon, Note, The Generalized Grievance
Restriction: Prudential Restraint or Constitutional Mandate?, 70 GEO. L.J. 1157, 1173–74 (1982);
Jaffe, supra note 63, at 1033–37)). As Heather Elliott recently observed, however, the doctrine’s own terms fail to justify the argument that widely shared harms are foreclosed
under the injury-in-fact test because if the plaintiff is, in fact, injured, it is irrelevant
whether others share that same injury. Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
113. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179. The Court in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982), later adopted this reasoning in a decision rejecting taxpayer standing in the sole context in which it had been
recognized to date: a case raising an Establishment Clause claim. Id. at 469, 482. Justice
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constitutional challenge to President Bush’s executive orders creating
faith-based initiatives—a badly fractured Court preserved the holding
in Flast but refused to apply it,115 commenting that Flast “gave too little
weight” to separation of powers concerns by framing the question in
terms of the original theory behind standing—whether the case is judicially capable of resolution.116 The Hein Court thus both suggested
that the generalized grievance bar is derived from Article III and associated it with Article II, cautioning that a ruling for the plaintiffs
would “enlist the federal courts to superintend, at the behest of any
federal taxpayer, the speeches, statements, and myriad daily activities
of the President, his staff, and other Executive Branch officials,” in
contravention of Flast’s promise not to “transform federal courts into

Brennan dissented, accusing the majority of using standing rhetoric to deprive persons of
the right to vindicate legally protected interests in court. Id. at 492–93 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In 2006, in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006), the Court extended its rejection of taxpayer standing to state taxpayers. Id. at 345.
114. 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007). In Hein, an organization opposed to government endorsement of religion brought an Establishment Clause challenge to the use of federal money to
fund President Bush’s “faith-based” initiatives designed to encourage cooperation between
religious institutions and government. Id. at 2560–61 (plurality opinion). Justice Alito,
joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy, wrote the plurality opinion finding no
standing. See id. at 2559, 2561–72 (holding that the case falls outside the “narrow exception” contained in Flast because Congress did not expressly authorize the challenged expenditures). Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence. See id. at 2572–73 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (expressing the view that “Flast is correct and should not be called into
question” but that “[t]o find standing in the circumstances of this case would make the
narrow exception boundless” and impermissibly intrude on “the executive realm”). Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in the judgment, but opined that Flast should be overruled. See id. at 2573–74 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that “Flast is wholly irreconcilable
with the Article III restrictions on federal-court jurisdiction that this Court has repeatedly
confirmed are embodied in the doctrine of standing”). Justice Souter filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Justices Stevens, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined. See id. at 2584–88 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (suggesting that there is no basis for the distinction, made by the plurality,
between injuries caused by the Executive Branch and those caused by the Legislative
Branch). The Court had recently decided Lance v. Coffman, 127 S. Ct. 1194 (2007) (per
curiam), in which it found that voters lacked standing to bring an Election Clause challenge to the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision invalidating a legislative redistricting plan
in a separate case, because “[t]he only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law . . . has not
been followed,” which is “precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance
about the conduct of government that we have refused to countenance in the past.” Id. at
1196, 1198.
115. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2566 (plurality opinion) (finding that plaintiffs had failed to
challenge any specific congressional action or appropriation, as distinct from the facts of
Flast).
116. Id. at 2569; see also id. at 2583 (Scalia, J., concurring) (calling Flast “damaged
goods,” partly “because its cavalier treatment of the standing requirement . . . was explicitly
and erroneously premised on the idea that Article III standing does not perform a crucial
separation-of-powers function”).

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\mlr104.txt

244

unknown

Seq: 24

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

25-NOV-08

13:45

[VOL. 68:221

forums for taxpayers’ generalized grievances about the conduct of
government.”117
The status of the generalized grievance bar as a constitutional or
prudential limitation on standing remains vague, at best. Both Lujan
and Richardson obscured the scope and nature of the generalized
grievance ban because the plaintiffs were not mere ideologues seeking
to influence government behavior based solely on their citizen or taxpayer status; they suffered discernable aesthetic and informational
harms, respectively.118 By applying the generalized grievance bar to
such injuries, the Court conflated an otherwise prudential concept
with the constitutional requirement of injury-in-fact, making it difficult to draw meaningful lines between the political dispute and the
justiciable case in the public law context.119 Moreover, because undifferentiated injury is by definition injury shared with others, cases like
Lujan and Richardson created the impression that any harm that is
widely shared is subject to attack as a generalized grievance.120
Nonetheless, the bar on generalized grievances has proven more
porous in public law cases brought to enforce legislation than in the
constitutional context. An important distinguishing factor is the existence of citizen-suit statutes, which expressly authorize standing for
citizens to sue in federal court as a supplement to the executive’s enforcement apparatus. The Court has always acknowledged that Congress plays a role in standing analysis. In its 1940 decision in FCC v.
Sanders,121 the Court deferred to a statute authorizing aggrieved parties to appeal from the Commission’s orders in rejecting the government’s argument that the plaintiff’s injury could not trigger judicial
review.122 Because “[i]t is within the power of Congress to confer
such standing to prosecute an appeal,” the Court found that the plaintiff had the “requisite standing” to bring the case.123 Later, Warth v.
117. Id. at 2570 (plurality opinion) (internal quotations omitted).
118. See supra notes 27–38, 108–112 and accompanying text.
119. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, § 2.3, at 97 (“[I]n Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the
Court treated the bar on citizen standing as constitutional.”).
120. The EPA’s arguments in Massachusetts demonstrate this. See infra Part II.B. (discussing the Court’s rejection of EPA’s argument that standing is barred where harms are widely
shared).
121. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
122. Id. at 471, 476–77. Specifically, the Court referred to statutory language that provided for an appeal by an applicant for a license or permit or “by any other person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected by any decision of the Commission
granting or refusing any such application.” Id. at 476–77 (quoting a provision in the Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1093 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (2000))).
123. Id. at 477.
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Seldin124 relied on Sanders as an example to explain that, although a
generalized grievance “normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction,”125 this “prudential standing rule[ ]” can be overridden by Congress,126 which “may grant an express right of action to persons who
otherwise would be barred.”127 Plaintiffs still must demonstrate injury, but if Congress grants a right of action, the plaintiffs “may have
standing to seek relief on the basis of the legal rights and interests of
others, and, indeed, may invoke the general public interest in support
of their claim.”128
To the extent that the generalized grievance bar is prudential, it
makes perfect sense that Congress can override it. On this theory,
Congress could conceivably authorize a taxpayer alleging de minimis
financial injury to bring a lawsuit on the assumption that such a person has an injury that qualifies for constitutional standing. In doing
so, Congress would not be attempting to adjust the case or controversy
requirement of Article III by legislation but rather to foreclose courts
from prudentially refusing jurisdiction on the grounds that the harm
too closely resembles a generic complaint about the government that
is best left for resolution by the political branches. But if the bar is
constitutional, the power of Congress to affect standing is murkier.
Under Lujan, Congress’s inclusion of a broad citizen-suit provision to
effectuate legislation is meaningless in cases involving commonly
shared injury if the plaintiff cannot show particularized, differentiated
harm.
Lujan’s influence on public law standing analysis understandably
led Justice Scalia to dissent sharply from the majority opinion in FEC
v. Akins six years later, relying heavily on Richardson to support his
analysis.129 Akins made two major pronouncements about standing in
statutory enforcement cases: (1) it rejected the argument that “Congress lacks the constitutional power to authorize federal courts to adjudicate” a claim that looked like a generalized grievance;130 and (2) it
held that the generalized grievance bar does not require that widely
shared injuries be particularized or differentiated among individual
124. 422 U.S. 490, 493, 502 (1975) (rejecting standing to wage a constitutional challenge to municipal zoning practices).
125. Id. at 499.
126. Id. at 501.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See 524 U.S. 11, 29–37 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that the injury
suffered by the Akins plaintiffs was precisely the claim rejected in Richardson).
130. See id. at 20–22 (majority opinion) (distinguishing Richardson, in which the Court
denied standing to bring a generalized grievance).
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members of the populace, so long as they are concrete—as opposed
to abstract, like a “harm to the ‘common concern for obedience to
law.’”131 Despite its professions of fidelity to Lujan, the Akins Court
charted a different course for analyzing public law standing in statutory enforcement cases, a course that a careful reading of Massachusetts puts in the spotlight.
II. THE LATEST WORD: MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA
Massachusetts v. EPA132 waded directly into the Lujan/Akins muck.
It involved a challenge to the EPA’s failure to regulate global warming—an apparent sitting duck for a generalized grievance challenge,
as the Commonwealth’s claim resembled the “all who breathe” case
depicted by former Judge Scalia to illustrate his belief that only the
political process can resolve citizen grievances entailing no individualized harm to the plaintiff.133 Yet despite recent enhancements to the
Court’s conservative ranks, Justice Scalia’s theory of separation of powers did not carry the day. The Court refused to apply a generalized
grievance bar to standing. It cherry-picked a plaintiff for purposes of
finding particularized injury, but fell short in adhering to a Lujan
analysis of imminence and likely redressability—much to the consternation of the dissenters, including Justice Scalia. Nonetheless, I contend that the opinion did not merely expand the seemingly hopeless
morass that Part I.A describes. Nor did it simply define a new outlier
for special plaintiffs, as has been the fate of Akins. The Court essentially adhered to Akins while purporting to apply Lujan. In doing so, it
erected three signposts for standing in public law cases that, though
far from predictive, provide the foundation for a distinct and potentially superior paradigm than injury-in-fact offers.
A. The Problem: Global Warming and Executive Inaction
In the fall of 1999, a swath of private organizations with “greenfocused” missions (including Friends of the Earth, of Lujan fame)134
131. Id. at 23–24 (quoting Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 311 U.S. 295, 303
(1940)). In Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989), a unanimous Court
supported the latter principle by rejecting the argument that a suit brought by public interest groups to obtain information relating to potential judicial nominees under the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2006), was a generalized grievance because the injury was not “sufficiently discrete” from that of the population. Public Citizen,
491 U.S. at 449. Justice Scalia took no part in the decision. Id. at 442.
132. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
133. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
134. They included Alliance for Sustainable Communities; Applied Power Technologies, Inc.; Bio Fuels America; The California Solar Energy Industries Ass’n; Clements Envi-
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filed a rulemaking petition requesting that the EPA regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new automobiles pursuant to Section 202 of
the Clean Air Act (“CAA”),135 which requires the agency to regulate
emissions of air pollution from new cars.136 The petitioners argued
that new car emissions are substantially accelerating global warming,
thus harming “human health and the environment,” and that the EPA
impermissibly failed to regulate such emissions.137
Four years later, the EPA denied the petition,138 finding that (1)
“the [CAA] does not authorize the EPA to issue mandatory regulations to address global [warming]” because greenhouse gases are not
“air pollutants” under the statute; and (2) “even if [it had such] authority,” the EPA could lawfully decide to do nothing, because the
CAA conditioned regulation on the EPA’s own “‘judgment’” that an
air pollutant “endanger[s] public health or welfare.”139 Additionally,
in exercising that judgment, the EPA relied on a National Research
Council report to the White House which concluded that “a causal
link” between “human activities” and global warming “cannot be unequivocally established.”140
With intervenor States and local governments, the plaintiffs sued
under a CAA provision authorizing “review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any [new vehicle] emission[s] standard.”141
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled for the EPA, without resolving the EPA’s challenge to the
plaintiffs’ standing.142 Judge Sentelle filed a separate opinion, stating
that the plaintiffs lacked standing as “they had alleged that global
warming is ‘harmful to humanity at large,’ but could not allege ‘parronmental Corp.; Environmental Advocates; Environmental and Energy Study Institute;
Friends of the Earth, Inc.; Full Circle Energy Project, Inc.; The Green Party of Rhode
Island; Greenpeace USA; International Center for Technology Assessment; Network for
Environmental and Economic Responsibility of the United Church of Christ; New Jersey
Environmental Watch; New Mexico Solar Energy Ass’n; Oregon Environmental Council;
Public Citizen; Solar Energy Industries Ass’n and The SUN DAY Campaign. Massachusetts,
127 S. Ct. at 1449 n.15.
135. Id. at 1449.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000) (providing that “[t]he [EPA] Administrator shall by
regulation prescribe . . . standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any
class . . . of new motor vehicles . . . which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air
pollution”).
137. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1449.
138. Id. at 1450.
139. Id. at 1450, 1462 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)).
140. Id. at 1449–51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Id. at 1451; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000).
142. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1451–52.
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ticularized injury’ to themselves.”143 In dissent, Judge Tatel considered the “‘substantial probability’ . . . that projected rises in sea level
would lead to serious loss of coastal property . . . a ‘far cry’ from the
kind of generalized harm insufficient to ground Article III jurisdiction,” at least for Massachusetts.144
A divided Supreme Court reversed in an opinion that resolved
the standing question and addressed the merits. Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion, which Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsberg,
and Breyer joined.145 Conservative members of the Court, including
Justice Scalia, lined up adamantly on the other side of the debate.
Chief Justice Roberts dissented on the standing question, and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined his opinion.146
On the merits, the majority found that the CAA authorized the
EPA to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from new cars,147 and that
the EPA “offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal” to regulate
them under the CAA’s mandate.148 On the first issue, the Court concluded that “[t]he statutory text forecloses EPA’s [contrary] reading,”149 as it contained a “sweeping definition of ‘air pollutant’ [that]
includes ‘any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.’”150 Thus, the Court
found that the statute “[o]n its face . . . embraces all airborne compounds of whatever stripe.”151 With respect to the second issue, although the statute conditioned the exercise of authority on the EPA’s
formation of a “judgment,” the Court concluded that “the use of the
word ‘judgment’ is not a roving license to ignore the statutory text,”
but instead “must relate to whether an air pollutant ‘cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare’”; and if the EPA makes such a
finding, it is statutorily required to regulate emissions of the pollutant.152 “[W]hile the President has broad authority in foreign affairs,”
the Court explained, “that authority does not extend to the refusal to
143. Id. at 1452 (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
144. Id. (quoting Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 65, 66).
145. See id. at 1444, 1446–63.
146. See id. at 1463–71 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia filed a separate dissenting
opinion on the merits, which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito joined.
See id. at 1471–78 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 1459 (majority opinion).
148. Id. at 1463.
149. Id. at 1460.
150. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000)).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1462 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000)) (alteration in original).
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execute domestic laws.”153 Conceding that judicial review of agency
refusals to regulate is “‘extremely limited’ and ‘highly deferential,’”154
the Court determined that this was one of those fairly rare occasions
in which reversal was warranted.155
What has caught commentators’ attention is the majority’s novel
endowment of special solicitude for states’ standing.156 There were
numerous petitioners that alleged different harms attributable to the
EPA’s decision, but the Court focused solely on the injuries alleged by
Massachusetts. It distinguished Lujan as involving a private individual;
in contrast, Massachusetts “is a sovereign State and not . . . [a] normal
litigant[ ] for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction.”157
“When a State [such as Massachusetts] enters the Union, it surrenders
certain sovereign prerogatives,” leaving it powerless to force other
states or countries to limit their greenhouse gas emissions and hampering its ability to regulate emissions within its own state.158 “Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests,” therefore,
“entitled [it] to special solicitude in our standing analysis.”159 It may
well be that even the majority would not have found standing in the
absence of a state plaintiff and that, as a practical matter, only state
plaintiffs will find Massachusetts helpful in securing standing in environmental cases.160 Nonetheless, the majority opinion contains important language not expressly limited by state sovereignty interests
that carries broader implications for future standing disputes in statutory enforcement cases.

153. Id. at 1463.
154. Id. at 1459 (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n of Am., Inc. v.
United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
155. Id. at 1463.
156. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
157. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453–54.
158. Id. at 1454. Such sovereign powers, the Court explained, now reside in the federal
government and Congress, which through the Clean Air Act, “has ordered EPA to protect
Massachusetts . . . by prescribing [emission] standards” and created a “procedural right to
challenge” the agency’s refusal to exercise its rulemaking authority. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7521(a)(1) & 7607(b)(1) (2000)).
159. Id. at 1454–55.
160. The dissent was understandably flummoxed by the majority’s creation of “special
solicitude” for States in standing analysis and grounding its holding on that basis. See id. at
1463–65 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). There is nothing in Article III that accords special
solicitude to the States in delineating the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It is somewhat
disappointing that the majority chose to distinguish Lujan on that basis rather than wrestling with the ambiguities created by application of the injury-in-fact test to prior public law
cases. One might speculate that the “special solicitude” language was inserted for largely
political reasons, such as winning Justice Kennedy’s vote for the majority.
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Tinkering with a Broken Standard

As discussed in Part III below, Justice Stevens’s discussion of injury-in-fact on behalf of the majority was not the opening performance of the opinion on standing. He devoted several paragraphs to
describing the framework for analyzing standing in public cases
before getting to the minutiae of the three-part test applied in Lujan.161 When he finally addressed the concrete injuries that Massachusetts alleged, however, Justice Stevens’s stage-setting diversions
culminated in an Akins-style analysis of Lujan’s “adjectives.”
The generalized grievance bar factored heavily in Massachusetts.
It was the marquee argument against standing. Like Judge Sentelle
below, the EPA construed the generalized grievance bar as categorically forbidding adjudication of broadly shared injuries. It argued
that “because greenhouse gas emissions inflict widespread harm, the
doctrine of standing presents an insuperable jurisdictional
obstacle.”162
Justice Stevens acknowledged that the “serious and well recognized” harms of global warming affect every living creature on
earth.163 He pointed out, however, that the Court has never held that
the mere fact that an injury is “widely shared” defeats standing.164
The EPA found space to argue that the generalized grievance ban applies to all cases seeking broad relief for public harms in cases, like
Lujan, which suggest that the particularity element requires injuries
differentiated from those of a broader class of individuals.165 If many
people suffer from the warming planet, the argument goes, they must
band together and effectuate political change—they cannot invoke
the courts. In dissent, the Chief Justice adhered to this construction
of the generalized grievance bar, complaining that “[t]he very concept of global warming seems inconsistent with this particularization
requirement” because “[g]lobal warming is a phenomenon ‘harmful
161. See id. at 1452–53 (majority opinion).
162. Id. at 1453.
163. Id. at 1455–56.
164. See id. at 1456 (citing FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (stating that the fact that
a harm is shared by many persons does not render it non-justiciable)); see also Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 496–97
(1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[I]t can hardly be argued that the Constitution bars
from federal court a plaintiff who has suffered injury merely because others are similarly
aggrieved . . . [a]nd it is equally clear that the Constitution draws no distinction between
injuries that are large, and those that are comparatively small.” (citations omitted)).
165. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453. See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 573–74 (1992) (providing support for EPA’s argument in Massachusetts by explaining
that a claim for relief “that no more directly and tangibly benefits [the individual] than it
does the public at large” fails to provide a basis for standing).
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to humanity at large,’ and the redress petitioners seek is focused no
more on them than on the public generally—it is literally to change
the atmosphere around the world.”166
The majority recognized, however, that the government’s argument that global warming is per se non-justiciable reflected a fundamental misunderstanding of the generalized grievance bar. The
Court explained that simply because the “environmental damage yet
to come” as a result of climate change is “‘widely shared’ [did] not
minimize Massachusetts’ interest in the outcome of this litigation.”167
The Court went on to quote Akins: “‘[W]here a harm is concrete,
though widely shared, the Court has found injury in fact.’”168 In
Akins, the Court did not require a showing that the plaintiff’s harm—a
lack of information—was distinct from that of the broader populace.169 The Massachusetts case thus reestablished the original scope
and purposes of the generalized grievance bar—keeping out of court
those cases that smack of generic complaints about the government’s
compliance with the Constitution or the laws of Congress—and suggested that Akins properly understood this concept as operating independently of the particularity requirement of the injury-in-fact test.
For this reason alone, Massachusetts adds value to the jurisprudence of
public law standing.
To be sure, the majority proceeded to satisfy Lujan by finding
that particularized injury existed because the “rising seas have already
begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land.”170 On a number of
other fronts, however, the Court appeared to ascribe to the more lenient theory of public law standing that Akins adopted. First, it suggested that Congress has the power to alter the constitutional standing
analysis. The Court did not embrace the Lujan majority’s view that
Congress’s authorization of a suit has no bearing on constitutional
standing analysis. Instead, it quoted Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in
Lujan, deeming it “of critical importance” that Congress authorized
the lawsuit, as Congress can “‘define injuries . . . that will give rise to a
166. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1467 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Massachusetts
v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 60 (2005) (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
judgment)).
167. Id. at 1455–56 (majority opinion) (quoting Akins, 524 U.S. at 24).
168. Id. at 1456 (quoting Akins, 524 U.S. at 24) (internal quotation marks omitted).
169. Cf. Amanda C. Leiter, Substance or Illusion? The Dangers of Imposing a Standing Threshold, 97 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (characterizing Massachusetts as narrowing the reach
of Akins, because it garnered only a five-member majority of the Court and because Justice
Stevens’s discussion of injury focused solely on pre-existing property loss versus future sea
level rise).
170. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1456.
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case or controversy where none existed before’ ” so long as it “ ‘identif[ies] the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate[s] the injury to the
class of persons entitled to bring suit.’ ”171 This passage lends support
to the theory underlying Akins, namely, that Congress can define
which plaintiffs—as a class—can constitutionally bring a lawsuit, with
the only constraint being the classic generalized grievance bar prohibiting “‘citizen suits to vindicate the public’s nonconcrete interest in
the proper administration of the laws.’”172 In other words, undifferentiated injury may not be objectionable per se in statutory enforcement cases, so long as Congress authorized the suit and
“concreteness” remains.173
Second, on the questions of imminence and the closely related
concept of redressability, the Court did not subscribe to Lujan’s rigid
formulations. It credited statements in affidavits that global sea levels
had “already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land,” and underscored one Massachusetts official’s belief that additional coastline
will be affected in the future.174 The dissenters charged the majority
with “render[ing] requirements of imminence and immediacy utterly
toothless,”175 because it found nothing in the record but “a single conclusory statement . . . to support an inference of actual loss of Massachusetts coastal land from 20th century global sea level increases.”176
The dissenters’ view appears to comport with the injury-in-fact elements articulated in Lujan, which “are not mere pleading requirements but . . . must be supported in the same way as any other matter
on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner
and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.”177 The Massachusetts majority responded simply that
“[p]etitioners maintain that the seas are rising and will continue to
rise, and have alleged that such a rise will lead to the loss of Massachusetts’ sovereign territory,” and that “[o]ur cases require nothing
more.”178
171. Id. at 1453 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)); see also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
172. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
173. See infra Part III.C.
174. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1456.
175. Id. at 1468 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2 (majority
opinion)).
176. Id. at 1467.
177. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
178. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1456–57 n.21 (majority opinion).
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The Court also found “essentially irrelevant” the EPA’s Lujan-style
arguments that the replacement of the millions of existing cars would
delay redress indefinitely for the harms alleged by the plaintiffs, and
that the greater culprits are “developing countries such as China and
India,” which are projected to “substantially” increase emissions.179
The Court instead credited testimony that domestic cars emit a significant amount of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, and recognized
petitioners’ argument that this “meaningful contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations,” which the EPA refused to regulate, contributes to global warming.180 Standing was satisfied if the EPA
regulatory activity would “slow or reduce” global warming, even if it
could not reverse it; to hold otherwise, the majority concluded,
“would doom most challenges to regulatory action.”181 The dissent
took issue with the Court’s incremental approach to redressability, arguing that “[p]etitioners are never able to trace their alleged injuries
back . . . to the fractional amount of global emissions that might have
been limited with EPA standards.”182 Noting that the complained-of
“150-year global phenomenon” has numerous causes, the dissent
called the majority’s analysis a “sleight-of-hand,” as “[t]he realities
make it pure conjecture to suppose that EPA regulation of new automobile emissions will likely prevent the loss of Massachusetts coastal
land.”183
179. Id. at 1457–58; cf. id. at 1469 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (challenging the majority’s
conclusion by noting that domestic new cars account for only four percent of greenhouse
gas emissions globally, and that “80 percent of global . . . emissions [emanate from] outside
the United States”). By contrast, the Lujan plurality had found a ten percent financial
contribution to offshore projects affecting endangered species insufficient to satisfy redressability. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
180. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1457–58 (majority opinion).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1469 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 1469–70. The dissent likened the majority’s causation and redressability analysis to the “previous high-water mark of diluted standing requirements.” Id. at 1470–71
(citing United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669 (1973)). In SCRAP, an environmental association formed by law students brought
an action challenging Interstate Commerce Commission orders allowing railroads to collect a 2.5 percent surcharge on freight rates pending adoption of selective rate increases.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 674, 678. SCRAP alleged that the higher rate structure would discourage the use of “recyclable” materials, causing further consumption of forests and other
natural resources and resulting in more refuse and undisposable materials to pollute the
environment. Id. at 676, 678. The Court held that SCRAP had standing, relying on the
allegation that its members used the forests, streams, mountains, and other resources in
the Washington, D.C., area for recreation, and the increased waste brought about by the
rate increase would harm the group’s members. Id. at 688. Even in the SCRAP decision,
Chief Justice Roberts noted in his Massachusetts dissent, the majority conceded that “what
was required was ‘something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable.’” Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1471 n.2 (quoting SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688).
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Third, the majority’s holding that Massachusetts had standing to
sue the EPA over dissatisfaction with its progress on regulating global
warming implicitly challenged the fortitude of Justice Scalia’s theory
that standing exists to ensure that the judiciary does not impede on
the executive’s power. The Court rebuffed the EPA’s attempt to lie
behind the log on regulation of greenhouse gases as a means of preserving “agency discretion to pursue other priorities of the Administrator or the President.”184 Justice Scalia’s private law theory of
justiciability would appear to reject this kind of judicial intervention
into the political realm.185 In dissent, therefore, Chief Justice Roberts
relied on Lujan to emphasize that the “problem” of global warming
has not “escaped the attention of policymakers in the Executive and
Legislative Branches of our Government,” and that “[t]his Court’s
standing jurisprudence . . . recognizes that redress of grievances of the
sort at issue here ‘is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive,’ not the federal courts.”186 Ironically, however, Lujan’s emphasis
on injury-in-fact may have worked to the disadvantage of the dissenting Justices, as the particularized nature of Massachusetts’ lost coastline masked the broader Article II problems associated with the
requested relief—an order directing the EPA to muster the political
will to regulate car emissions that may contribute to global warming,
despite the White House’s contrary leanings.187 As a consequence,
Lujan’s separation of powers rationale—tacked onto injury-in-fact after the doctrine supplanted the legal rights model as a means of ensuring concrete adversity—hung in the balance.
Fourth, as shown below, although the majority found particularized injury in the form of receding Massachusetts coastline, it also
identified several important caveats to the private law model of adjudication applied in Lujan, which may represent a necessary accommodation to the nuances of public rights problems.188
184. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1462 (majority opinion).
185. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
186. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1463–64 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992)).
187. The EPA ended up punting the question to the next administration in any event by
seeking public comment on the feasibility of using the CAA to address global warming
rather than issuing regulations addressing emissions from new cars. See Juliet Eilperin, EPA
Seeks Comments on Emissions Rules, Then Discredits Efforts, WASH. POST, July 12, 2008, at A4.
188. Susan Bandes has compellingly argued that “[t]he Court uses contorted logic and
tortured language to fit a public rights problem into the private rights mold,” a “distortion
[that] leads to incoherence and unpredictability, as well as to a lack of judicial accountability” because “[t]he private rights vision does not accommodate evolving social norms and
cannot recognize the collective nature of rights and the systemic nature of harms.” See
Bandes, supra note 78, at 318–19.
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What, then, are the contours of the injury-in-fact test after Massachusetts? Although technically Massachusetts’ alleged loss of coastal
lands satisfied Lujan’s construction of the particularization requirement, the Court’s findings that projections of harm were sufficiently
imminent and that an order directing the EPA to regulate new car
emissions would likely redress the injury moved a class of public law
standing cases away from Lujan’s stronghold and in the direction of
the approach taken in Akins.189 Massachusetts nudged an imminent
injury standard towards one that credits projections of injury, and a
likely-to-be-redressed standard towards one that accepts at face value
the plaintiff’s claim that the relief sought will make a “meaningful
contribution” to redressing the injury.190 What remains to be determined is, under the test for standing in public law cases as Massachusetts recalibrates it, which cases alleging commonly shared harms are
justiciable and which are not. In the next Part, I attempt to bring
some coherence to the law in this area by defending an alternative to
the conventional injury-in-fact standard that is based on three criteria
derived from the majority opinion in Massachusetts.
III. CRACKS IN THE MORTAR: UNDERSTANDING
GENERALIZED GRIEVANCES

THE

JUSTICIABLE

Despite the majority’s professions of fidelity to Lujan, the Massachusetts case may be an incremental defeat for the conservatives on the
Court who subscribe to a purely private law model of adjudication on
separation of powers grounds. In this Part, I describe three signposts
for adjudicating standing that are inherent in Akins and Massachusetts
and suggest that the Court disavow Lujan’s requirement of particularized, individualized injury in favor of a reconceptualized framework
for analyzing standing in public law cases in which plaintiffs seek to
189. It should be noted that a narrow reading of Massachusetts that carves off the
States—as possessors of “special solicitude”—from the strictures of injury-in-fact, causation,
and redressability, but leaves the private sector to the rigidities of that standard, seems
defensible. See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text. It would mean that States can
bring environmental cases of broad reach, so long as they can articulate some personal
stake such as the deterioration of coastal lands alleged in this case. Massachusetts has a
greater interest in EPA regulation of greenhouse gas emissions than the generic plaintiff
because it is responsible for management of state resources. A “states-only” construction of
Massachusetts would operate to grant environmental standing but limit it to scenarios where
there is enough interest amongst the citizenry to prompt the states to spend political capital to force the issue. The environmental issue, in other words, would have been vetted
through the political process before a State brings such a case. The democratic process
would have thereby fingered the issue as warranting the attention of the federal courts in
ensuring adequate enforcement of the applicable law by the executive.
190. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1457–58 (majority opinion).
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enforce a statute that indistinguishably benefits the public. In particular, injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability analysis should assume
a different tenor when the case exhibits three characteristics: (1) an
invocation of “procedural rights” created by statute and implicated by
a federal agency’s action or failure to act; (2) a sufficiently concrete
“personal stake” in the outcome of the case on the part of the plaintiff; and (3) congressional authorization to bring the challenge.
Such an approach has several advantages. It is more attuned to
the realities of public law litigation, which the injury-in-fact test cannot
serve without producing vast practical and theoretical problems.191 It
is also based on a number of propositions that, when viewed independently, are uncontroversial. A majority of the Court, including Justice
Scalia, agrees that some concrete stake is necessary for standing, and
that some procedural injuries are incompatible with causation and
redressability requirements.192 Thus, the approach I draw from Massachusetts does not require the dismantling of standing doctrine as we
know it, as other commentators have reasonably proposed,193 but is
based on an application of principles already endorsed by the Court.
As for the impact of congressional authorization of standing, such a
framework gives appropriate weight to congressional grants of the
right to sue federal officials or agencies, and clears up the ambiguity
associated with the generalized grievance bar by confining it to its
original purpose—preventing federal courts from becoming the
“ombudsmen of the general welfare.”194 Further, it recognizes that
federal courts play an important role in the separation of powers by
ensuring executive accountability in areas where Congress has signaled that deficiencies in the political process would otherwise leave
commonly shared injuries unredressed.
191. Other commentators favor development of an affirmative public law model, “which
[would] more effectively safeguard public constitutional values in an increasingly
bureaucratized society.” See Bandes, supra note 78, at 276–87 & n.335 (discussing scholarship and stating that “[t]he private rights model offers little guidance in evaluating intangibles like concern for the environment or vote dilution”); Percival, supra note 4, at 136
(arguing that the private law model is inapposite in public law cases because, “[u]nlike the
traditional model of private law litigation where one party seeks redress for harm caused by
another, public law litigation seeks to require agencies to conform to law when exercising
their regulatory authorities to prevent diffuse harm to the general public”).
192. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 & n.7 (1992) (revealing Justice
Scalia’s views with respect to concrete interests and certain procedural injuries).
193. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 112 (arguing for development of a “vibrant abstention
doctrine” to replace most current applications of standing doctrine).
194. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 487 (1982) (suggesting that the generalized grievance bar prevents
plaintiffs from “roam[ing] the country in search of governmental wrongdoing and [revealing] their discoveries in federal court”).

R
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A. Leniency for Procedural Injuries
First, the Massachusetts Court brought Justice Scalia’s procedural
rights caveat from Lujan into mainstream standing doctrine. It found
that the CAA’s provision authorizing judicial review constituted a congressional recognition of Massachusetts’s “procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition.”195 Justice Stevens
stated that “a litigant to whom Congress has ‘accorded a procedural
right to protect his concrete interests’—here, the right to challenge
agency action unlawfully withheld—‘can assert that right without
meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.’”196 Such a “litigant has standing if there is some possibility that
the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider
the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.”197 Hence, the Massachusetts majority cemented a significant exception to the traditional
Lujan test—relaxed immediacy and redressability in public law cases
involving a procedural right granted by Congress.
Of course, a crucial question arises as to what makes a procedural
violation justiciable for purposes of this forgiving analysis.198 At first
195. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000)).
196. Id. at 1453 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 and citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)).
197. Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 and quoting Sugar Cane Growers Coop. v.
Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“A [litigant] who alleges a deprivation of a
procedural protection to which he is entitled never has to prove that if he had received the
procedure the substantive result would have been altered. All that is necessary is to show
that the procedural step was connected to the substantive result.”) (alteration in the
original)).
198. The Court appears to have largely neglected the question of what constitutes a
“procedural right” versus a non-justiciable interest in seeing that the government abides by
procedures in the first instance, although the Lujan majority made the distinction. See
supra note 43–45 and accompanying text. Justice Blackmun in his dissenting opinion
noted that “I have the greatest sympathy for the courts across the country that will struggle
to understand the Court’s standardless exposition of this concept today,” and suggested
that:
Most governmental conduct can be classified as procedural . . . . In complex
regulatory areas . . . Congress often legislates . . . in procedural shades of gray . . . .
[I]t sets forth substantive policy goals and provides for their attainment by requiring Executive Branch officials to follow certain procedures, for example, in the
form of reporting, consultation, and certification requirements.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 601–02 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Attempts at a more refined definition, however, readily become circular. See, e.g., Hodges
v. Abraham, 300 F.3d 432, 444 (4th Cir. 2002) (defining “a procedural right” as “the right
to have the Executive observe procedures mandated by law” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). In this piece, I chip away at this question by identifying the outliers—the plaintiff seeking an individualized hearing to which she is constitutionally entitled and the ideologue complaining that the government failed to comply with a procedural requirement
set forth somewhere in law—but do not attempt here to categorize the myriad kinds of
procedures applicable to agencies into those that qualify as justiciable “procedural rights”

R

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\mlr104.txt

258

unknown

Seq: 38

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

25-NOV-08

13:45

[VOL. 68:221

blush, the answer seems simple. Plaintiffs routinely challenge agency
actions on the grounds that the agency failed to follow procedures
required by law. When, for example, a private plaintiff raises procedural complaints in an adjudication involving that party, the alleged error may be ordinary, such as the failure to provide a proper hearing
required by due process or the failure to comply with the APA’s procedural requirements for formal adjudications.199 Such an individual
plaintiff’s standing hinges on allegations of a separate cognizable injury—such as a denial of welfare benefits—for which she would have
standing to challenge defects in the process used to reach that
decision.200
A thornier issue is whether, assuming the plaintiff received the
welfare benefits due, she would still have standing to sue an agency for
having failed to follow the requisite procedures. Few welfare beneficiaries are likely to engage in litigation to ensure proper adherence to
hearing requirements if they cannot identify some concrete harm that
they want redressed.
Nonetheless, one might envision a definition of “procedural
rights” that embraces cases brought to ensure the plaintiff’s right to
participate and be heard, regardless of whether the plaintiff demonstrates some separate concrete harm. Procedural due process is triggered if life, liberty, or property is at stake,201 and Congress can create
legal entitlements that, if withdrawn or compromised, carry due process protections, notwithstanding that such “rights” did not exist at
common law.202 The Supreme Court employs a balancing test to determine how much process is due to protect a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.203 Hence, if a statutory procedure
aimed at protecting a recognized liberty or property interest is constitutionally sufficient to protect that interest and if an agency fails to
and those that do not. Peter Raven-Hansen has addressed this issue by drawing a distinction between regulatory or statutory procedures that are “intended to benefit the public,”
which are mandatory, and internal procedures designed primarily for the “benefit of the
agency—to promote uniformity, order, and convenience in the conduct of public business.” Peter Raven-Hansen, Regulatory Estoppel: When Agencies Break Their Own “Laws,” 64
TEX. L. REV. 1, 20–22 (1985). The latter, he observes, may be waivable. See id. at 22.
199. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (2006) (setting forth APA requirements for formal
adjudications).
200. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.
201. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
202. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (considering whether the
deprivation of legal entitlements such as welfare benefits constitutes a violation of due
process); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261–62 & n.8 (1970) (same).
203. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341–47 (1976) (discussing factors relevant to
ascertaining due process requisites).
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comply with that procedure, the fact of the procedural violation may
be sufficient to create an Article III case or controversy even if the
plaintiff cannot show that the deprivation caused some related harm
that would independently satisfy injury-in-fact.
It is unlikely, however, that Justice Scalia had such a conception
of procedural rights in mind when he wrote footnote seven of his Lujan opinion. He did not confine his procedural rights caveat to those
cases in which the plaintiff has an individual right to due process, such
as that of the welfare beneficiary denied a hearing, but he would extend relaxed causation and redressability requirements to:
[those cases] where plaintiffs are seeking to enforce a procedural requirement the disregard of which could impair a
separate concrete interest of theirs (e.g., the procedural requirement for a hearing prior to denial of their license application, or the procedural requirement for an environmental
impact statement before a federal facility is constructed next
door to them).204
Although licenses may be considered property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause,205 it is harder to understand the procedural requirement for an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) as
constituting the constitutional minima that must be afforded before a
property owner can be deprived of his property. The property owner
may be entitled to a full-blown preliminary injunction hearing on the
grounds that the government action would amount to a constitutional
taking, and that court action might result in an order directing the
agency to produce an EIS, but the property owner is not likely to be
constitutionally entitled to an EIS in addition to a hearing in order to
satisfy the procedural minima that deprivation of his property affords.
Alternatively, a statutorily mandated procedure itself may create a
property or liberty interest by creating a legal entitlement similar to
those interests recognized as sufficient to establish standing under the
antiquated legal rights conception of standing. The Court has refined
the concept of a legal entitlement in various ways. It has looked to
whether a statute or other source of positive law creates a reasonable
expectation of entitlement on the part of a covered party.206 The
more a statute limits the government’s discretion in some way, the

204. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 & n.7 (1992).
205. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979).
206. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
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greater the likelihood that a legal entitlement is created.207 But these
standards assume that the thing a covered person is entitled to is, at
the end of the day, property or liberty. Thus, allowance for “good
time” credits on the part of prisoners is a legal entitlement because it
creates a liberty interest in freedom from extended incarceration.208
A right to a specified procedure, in and of itself, does not create any
liberty or property interests. The procedure might protect against arbitrary deprivation of liberty or property, but the mere failure to follow the procedure does not trigger procedural due process
protections unless such a failure impacts constitutionally protected interests. Although the homeowner could point to a property interest
in his home as prompting due process protections, such an interest is
not created by the EIS requirements themselves. Thus, although qualifying for “special treatment” under Lujan’s footnote seven,209 an individual denied a right to a hearing does not define the ambit of the
procedural rights exception to normal causation and redressability
standards.
It is easy to understand why the other extreme that Justice Scalia
identifies, that is “standing for persons who have no concrete interests
affected—persons who live (and propose to live) at the other end of
the country from the dam,” does not warrant special “procedural
rights” treatment.210 A suit brought by a person with no proximity to
the dam would be analogous to the citizen and taxpayer standing suits
raising ideological disparities with executive branch authorities that
have long been foreclosed under well-settled Supreme Court precedent. Because public law is about defining and controlling the process and activities of government,211 including its compliance with
countless statutory and regulatory procedures, there is a danger of
overreading the “procedural rights” exception. It is possible to characterize many, if not most, claims that aim to get the government to
do its job as attempts to vindicate procedural rights to have the government comply with the law, leaving no limit on the statutory cases
that federal courts may hear. Such arguments blur the right to a particular procedure with the merits of the government’s action and have
207. See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (noting that a
“benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in their
discretion”).
208. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (holding that state law that created a “good time” credit system by which inmates could reduce their sentences created a
liberty interest in those credits, which could not be taken away without due process).
209. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
210. See id.
211. See generally Bell, supra note 13, at 236–38 (describing the functions of public law).
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the potential for authorizing standing where no injury actually occurs
other than abstract noncompliance with the law.
Justice Scalia’s competing illustration—that of a plaintiff challenging an agency’s failure to complete an environmental impact
statement prior to building a dam next door212—is the most difficult
to parse under the normal injury-in-fact test. In theory, standing
might lie only if such a plaintiff could articulate some concrete injury
flowing from a violation of the procedure, such as psychological
harms caused by the process. But the homeowner plaintiff who would
have standing in Justice Scalia’s view is merely alleging that he anticipates that the failure to prepare an EIS will harm him or his property
somehow, and that this risk of injury itself confers standing.213 Such
an injury is not imminent to the extent that the dam will not be completed until some future date. Arguably, therefore, it is not sufficiently particularized under Lujan, which rejected the plaintiffs’
allegations of injury because they included no showing that aesthetic
harm was imminent in connection with a future visit to the environmental sites.214
A better argument under Lujan is that the person living next to
the dam does have standing, as he resembles the hypothetical plaintiff
212. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
213. Courts have evaluated such cases based on the probability or risk of harm. See, e.g.,
Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 972–75 (9th Cir. 2003)
(stating that procedural rights plaintiffs “need only establish the reasonable probability of
the challenged action’s threat to [their] concrete interest” (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in the original)); Desert Citizens Against Pollution v. Bisson, 231 F.3d
1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying Lujan procedural rights language); Utah v. Babbitt,
137 F.3d 1193, 1210 n.26 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding procedural injury insufficient to satisfy
standing absent showing of concrete injury resulting from procedural violation); Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665–66 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying a test for standing
in procedural rights case that included a showing that “a particularized environmental
interest of [the plaintiffs] will suffer demonstrably increased risk” and that it is “substantially probable” that the agency action will cause the injury); Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo
v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 451–52 (10th Cir. 1996) (disagreeing with Florida Audubon’s “substantial probability” test and requiring plaintiffs to establish an “increased risk of adverse
environmental consequences” from an alleged failure to follow NEPA); Portland Audubon
Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1537 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
“environmental groups have Article III standing if for no other reason than that they allege
procedural violations in an agency process in which they participated”). Whether they
have done so coherently or successfully is beyond the scope of this paper, although others
have addressed the subject. See generally Leiter, supra note 169 (discussing D.C. Circuit law
regarding probability of risk of harm); Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is
Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1, 45–63, 82–83 (2005) (discussing the Circuit split
regarding standing analysis in NEPA procedural rights cases and arguing that courts
should use a “reasonable possibility” standard in suits challenging governmental responses
to global warming).
214. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564.
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who regularly visits an environmental site—he can show imminent injury to his property values and/or to his aesthetic enjoyment of his
home because he lives there, or at least occupies it with some regularity. But even assuming arguendo that Lujan recommends such an outcome, what kind of standard does this imply for the broader category
of public law cases lying between the outliers of the individual plaintiff
denied due process and the malcontent complaining about bad government? As commentators have observed, “Congress often requires
that agencies conform to certain decisional processes that require
them to take into account specially identified public interests or values.”215 In a rulemaking conducted for the benefit of the general
public, an agency may be statutorily required to take into account certain considerations or costs, to engage certain governmental actors, or
to make certain preliminary determinations before taking an action.216 The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), for example, requires agencies to consider the environmental impact of
proposed actions in myriad ways.217 Such procedures do not operate
to protect any particular party whose rights are at stake in an individualized determination. They protect and benefit the public as a whole.
What must a plaintiff show to have standing to force compliance with
them?
Justice Scalia’s talk of procedural rights for such a plaintiff could
suggest quite simply that the failure to follow a procedure required by
statute itself creates an injury, regardless of whether procedural due
process protections are implicated. The congressionally mandated
procedure, in other words, creates some kind of legal right without
constitutional implications, and the injury is substantively linked to
that procedure. Justice Blackmun embraced such congressionally created injury in his dissenting opinion in Lujan:
It is to be hoped that over time the Court will acknowledge
that some classes of procedural duties are so enmeshed with
the prevention of a substantive, concrete harm that an individual plaintiff may be able to demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of injury just through the breach of that procedural
duty.218
215. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 400 (2d ed. 2001).
216. See id.
217. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (2000); see
generally Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756–57 (2004) (observing that
NEPA “imposes only procedural requirements on federal agencies with a particular focus
on requiring agencies to undertake analyses of the environmental impact of their proposals and actions”).
218. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 605 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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But this scenario is incompatible with the requirements of particularized and actual or imminent injury-in-fact, as well as with Justice
Scalia’s theory of standing as protecting only private rights; a majority
of the Court rejected it expressly in Lujan.219
The most satisfying understanding of the EIS example in Justice
Scalia’s procedural rights discussion lies somewhere short of traditional injury-in-fact. The EIS is not constitutionally required, nor does
it create an actionable legal right. But EIS requirements lend further
assurance to the homeowner that his property rights will not be arbitrarily taken from him, thereby increasing his “stake” in ensuring that
an EIS is prepared, if required. Justice Scalia recognized that plaintiffs need not satisfy traditional standing requirements in cases involving procedural rights, so long as they retain a “separate concrete
interest” in the outcome.220 In other words, if there is a procedural
violation, the plaintiff does not need as much concrete harm as the
injury-in-fact test would otherwise require. A procedural right and a
concrete stake operate as reciprocals, just as an allegation of a procedural violation relaxes causation and redressability requirements.
For a number of reasons, the linkage between a procedural injury
and the pre-Scalia conception of standing as requiring a concrete personal stake—divorced of the trappings of particularization, imminence, or redressability—provides a better and more consistent way of
memorializing in coherent doctrine the inevitable need to find standing in public law cases for which traditional constructions of causation
and redressability cannot be satisfied. By tolerating a relaxed causation and redressability analysis for the EIS plaintiff, Lujan reveals the
fundamental ineptitude of the injury-in-fact test as a reasonable measure of constitutional standing in public law cases. If causation,
redressability, and the related requirement of imminence are constitutionally mandated, the Court has no choice but to apply them equally
to “procedural injuries.” If they are merely prudential barriers imposed by judges, Congress’s authorization of standing for the Lujan
plaintiffs should have resolved the causation and redressability questions in that case. The procedural rights exception thus appears to be
219. See id. at 573 n.8 (majority opinion) (“If we understand [the dissent] correctly, it
means that the Government’s violation of a certain (undescribed) class of procedural duty
satisfies the concrete-injury requirement by itself, without any showing that the procedural
violation endangers a concrete interest of the plaintiff (apart from his interest in having
the procedure observed). We cannot agree.”).
220. Id. at 572 & n.7. In dissent, Justice Blackmun similarly observed that “[the] actionforcing procedures” contained in the ESA “are designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of persons who observe and work with endangered or threatened species.”
Id. at 603 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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a creature of practical necessity. Because the application of a likely
redressability standard would leave no plaintiff positioned to challenge
the government’s failure to comply with a statutory requirement for
an EIS—other than perhaps the homeowner filing suit after the dam’s
construction to obtain its destruction—Justice Scalia carved out a hole
in the prevailing test for standing in public law cases.
Most plaintiffs are similarly incapable of showing that the government’s compliance with the correct procedure will even likely produce the desired result. Standing analysis must adjust to account for
this causation problem and it has done so. But the Court has tinkered
with the injury-in-fact analysis in public law cases without so acknowledging, without articulating any meaningful standards for applying
the altered test, and without constraining itself from exercising excessive subjectivity in the process.
The express relaxation of redressability in procedural rights cases
reflects a more realistic approach to the realities of public law litigation, in which the Lujan adjectives are notoriously difficult to apply
with fidelity. The Court should take the further step of construing
“procedural rights” to enable standing in a broader class of cases—
one in which plaintiffs demonstrate a concrete stake in the government’s compliance with statutorily required procedures, even if that
stake would not independently satisfy each nuance of the standard
injury-in-fact test—and make clear that the Lujan majority’s injury-infact analysis does not apply in that context.221
B. Old Rhetoric, New Vigor: The Concrete Stake
Second, the Massachusetts majority used the “concrete” or “personal stake” language of Baker v. Carr that historically characterized
standing jurisprudence, prior to the advent of the separation-of-powers rationale, to justify the majority’s rejection of the generalized
grievance argument and to preface its analysis of injury-in-fact. Justice
Stevens reiterated that, “[a]t bottom, ‘the gist of the question of standing’ is whether petitioners have ‘such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely de221. See Buzbee, supra note 47, at 803 (stating that a “substantial body of judicial and
scholarly analysis concludes that plaintiffs with an underlying ‘concrete’ interest have
standing to complain of agency procedural breaches of law despite uncertain proof of
causality or redressability in the sense of guaranteed or likely avoidance of the underlying
threatened injury to a real interest”); id. at 790–91 n.138 (citing articles analyzing Lujan’s
discussion of procedural rights).
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pends for illumination.’”222 He then quoted Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in Lujan—which similarly utilized the concrete stake
concept for analyzing standing in a generalized grievance context—as
if it were a leading opinion:
While it does not matter how many persons have been injured by the challenged action, the party bringing suit must
show that the action injures him in a concrete and personal
way. This requirement is not just an empty formality. It preserves the vitality of the adversarial process by assuring both
that the parties before the court have an actual, as opposed
to professed, stake in the outcome, and that the legal questions presented . . . will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context
conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of
judicial action.223
Some version of the concrete or personal stake concept underlies
all public law standing jurisprudence.224 In his Lujan opinion, Justice
Scalia linked that concept with the adjectives in declaring that a particularized and actual or imminent injury-in-fact is normally required
in order to establish the requisite personal stake.225 The Akins majority construed the injury-in-fact limitation more loosely, as “help[ing]
assure that courts will not ‘pass upon . . . abstract, intellectual
problems,’ but adjudicate ‘concrete, living contest[s] between adversaries.’”226 The Massachusetts Court extended the reasoning in Akins
in holding that the undifferentiated nature of certain widespread injuries is not preclusive of standing, so long as the plaintiff has some
personal stake that is concrete.227
The issue under this formulation, then, becomes whether the
plaintiff was injured in a concrete and personal—but not necessarily
individualized or differentiated—way. Concededly, this factor is itself
contingent on adjectives, but it does a better job at capturing the nec222. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962)).
223. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
224. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978)
(stating that the requirement of a “personal stake” has been “refined by subsequent reformulation,” and “has come to be understood to require not only a distinct and palpable
injury, to the plaintiff, but also a fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed
injury and the challenged conduct” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
225. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (majority opinion).
226. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998) (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460
(1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
227. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453–55.
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essary minima for standing than injury-in-fact does in statutory enforcement cases.
There is no exposition of Justice Scalia’s “concrete stake” showing
for plaintiffs alleging procedural error other than by way of illustration. As noted above, there is a good argument that the homeowner
in Justice Scalia’s EIS illustration suffers imminent injury-in-fact under
Lujan that distinguishes him from other interested parties in satisfaction of the particularization requirement. But his “stake” in the EIS is
also personal and concrete because he lives next to the dam and his
aesthetic interests associated with living in his existing home could be
affected someday. Characterized this way, the homeowner is distinguishable from the “all who breathe” category of plaintiff in a manner
that tidies the veritable mess that currently characterizes public law
standing cases that otherwise purport to studiously apply the prevailing injury-in-fact test. It reconciles the concept of particularized injury with the more realistic holding in Akins, in which the voterplaintiffs’ lack of information about a third party’s campaign-related
activities rendered their interest concrete notwithstanding that the alleged injury was not differentiated from the public at large nor necessarily redressable by a favorable judgment.228
At bottom, the language of concreteness simplifies what it means
to possess particularized injury in statutory enforcement cases: The
plaintiff must experience some discernable adverse consequence by
virtue of the defendant’s actions.229 In Baker v. Carr, which set forth
the personal stake concept, the analysis was straightforward. The
Court found that plaintiffs had standing to challenge a state voting
apportionment statute on equal protection grounds because they
“[sought] relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of their
own, and of those similarly situated . . . asserting a plain, direct and
adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes.”230
In Sierra Club v. Morton,231 the Court stated that “[t]he requirement
that a party seeking review must allege facts showing that he is himself
adversely affected . . . does serve as at least a rough attempt to put the
decision as to whether review will be sought in the hands of those who
228. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 23–25. Arguably, the homeowner’s stake in Justice Scalia’s
hypothetical is particularized by comparison, but not necessarily so.
229. To be sure, as Susan Bandes has observed, “concreteness [is] a matter of degree,
not . . . an absolute.” Bandes, supra note 78, at 267; cf. Nichol, supra note 12, at 336, 339
(arguing that the Court should stop using the injury requirement for statutory standing
and advocating a presumption of injury in nonstatutory cases).
230. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207–08 (1962) (internal quotation marks omitted).
231. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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have a direct stake in the outcome.”232 In public law cases seeking
relief that benefits more parties than the plaintiff in substantially similar ways, a rough attempt may be the best the Court can do. While the
adverse effect need not be unique to the plaintiff, it must be something more than mere “assertion of a right to a particular kind of Government conduct.”233
An utterly de minimis effect on the plaintiff, therefore, might still
not suffice. In Flast, the Court suggested that the “petitioner in Frothingham was denied standing not because she was a taxpayer but because her tax bill was not large enough.”234 In Justice Scalia’s words,
therefore, she was “not perceptibly affected by the unlawful action in
question.”235 An imperceptible injury is not an injury in a meaningful
sense of the term; like the generalized grievance bar, the concept
marks the outer limit of standing on a concreteness theory.236
The language of concreteness is a better proxy for injury in the
public law context than is injury-in-fact for a number of reasons.237
First, it detaches the particularization requirement from notions of
uniqueness, thus clearing up confusion regarding the scope of the
generalized grievance bar. Second, it lessens the subjectivity inherent
in the imminence requirement that Justice Blackmun decried in Lujan.238 Third, like Justice Scalia’s procedural rights exception, its association with the more relaxed conception of standing illustrated in
Baker v. Carr constitutes a recognition that public law cases necessitate
an altered standing paradigm, which includes relaxed standards for
causation and redressability. Fourth, it is grounded in longstanding,
consistent Supreme Court doctrine. Both the Lujan and Akins majorities distinguished widely shared harms that are justiciable from those
232. Id. at 740; see also Percival, supra note 4, at 134–35 (observing that the Massachusetts
Court’s “approach . . . is reminiscent of Sierra Club v. Morton where it described the purpose
of standing as ‘a rough attempt to put the decision as to whether review will be sought in
the hands of those who have a direct stake in the outcome’ that will neither ‘insulate
executive action from judicial review’ nor ‘prevent any public interests from being protected through the judicial process’” (quoting Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 740)).
233. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 483 (1982).
234. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 93 (1968).
235. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 524 U.S. 555, 566 (1992).
236. Louis Jaffe likened the denial of taxpayer standing in Frothingham to ruling that the
case raised a political question. Jaffe, supra note 63, at 1042 (discussing Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)).
237. Cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially
Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1176–77 (1993) (“Generalized allegations of logically plausible forms of individual injury should be sufficient to establish standing to obtain review of agency actions that have broad effects on the public.”).
238. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 593 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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that are non-justiciable by pointing to the concreteness of the alleged
injury or interest. In Lujan, Justice Scalia’s opinion acknowledged the
justiciability of “a case where concrete injury has been suffered by
many persons, as in mass fraud or mass tort situations.”239 The voterplaintiffs in Akins had no greater lack of information than the rest of
the voting public, but their injury was nonetheless concrete in the
sense that the plaintiffs perceptibly experienced it.240
To be sure, plaintiffs with a personal stake in a government action comprise a broader class of potential plaintiffs than do those with
particularized, imminent injury. The showing of a perceptible effect
on the plaintiff need only be enough to distinguish him from the citizen seeking to vindicate a generic right to a law-abiding government.
But this weaker standard is shored up by the legislative authority to
sue, which represents a meaningful measure of majority will to resolve
the claim on the merits.241
Furthermore, the dichotomy that the current formulation of particularized injury and the generalized grievance bar has, perhaps inadvertently, created—harms shared indiscriminately versus harms
suffered by one or more individuals in a unique and differentiated
way—is illusory. The entire population lacked the information sought
in Akins, but each individual experienced that “injury” differently as
each cast or declined to cast a vote, or participated or declined to
participate in some other way in the electoral process. Each member
of Friends of the Earth experienced aesthetic harms in a personal way,
depending on background, experience, personality, and ideology regardless of whether they planned to regularly visit the environmental
sites in question. One could alternatively argue that informational
harm or harms to aesthetics that do not arise from physical proximity
to environmental damage are completely undifferentiated from person to person, and that these distinctions are pure lawyer-spin with no
real meaning. In any event, it is difficult to see how the political process would better handle certain claims over others based on such nu239. Id. at 572 (majority opinion).
240. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1998) (finding that lack of election-related
information that must allegedly be disclosed by law was sufficiently concrete and specific,
notwithstanding the fact that the injury was widely shared).
241. See David A. Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 WIS.
L. REV. 37, 57–58 (making a similar point regarding a personal stake criterion and arguing
that prudential limitations should operate to deny standing); cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 151 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (opining that
“[a]dverse personal interest . . . is ordinarily sufficient to meet constitutional standards of
justiciability” where courts are “by statute . . . given jurisdiction over claims based on such
interests,” but that, “in the absence of a statute, something more than adverse personal
interest is needed” to establish standing).
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ances.242 The most reasonable distinction amongst justiciable and
generalized grievances, therefore, is between plaintiffs who sue in
their capacity as citizens or taxpayers to vindicate the rule of law and
other persons who can legitimately demonstrate a more concrete or
personal stake in the outcome.243 Although this standard may operate to broaden the field of possible plaintiffs, it evades the subjectivity
inherent in the injury-in-fact test’s analysis of how much harm is
enough to clear the hurdles of particularity, imminence, and the misunderstood generalized grievance bar, and thus injects more transparency and predictability into the standing analysis.244
In Massachusetts, moreover, the Court made an attempt at defining what kind of causation analysis applies in procedural rights
cases245: It would consider “some possibility that the requested relief
will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider” the harmful decision to be enough.246 Such a formulation more realistically accounts
for the realities of administrative litigation. Like Justice Scalia’s EIS
hypothetical, the plaintiffs’ injuries in Akins and Massachusetts may
never be redressed. The government might build the dam despite the
EIS, the FEC could decline to prosecute the third party in Akins after
further investigation, and the EPA’s actions on remand might have no
effect on climate change in Massachusetts. But the potential breaks in
the causation chains in these scenarios are not much different from
those that inhere in all administrative cases that result in a remand to
the agency for further action. To account for this, the Court pre-Massachusetts had relied on alternatives to likely redressability, such as the
existence of a “quantum of deterrence”247 or a “coercive effect”248 or
242. See generally Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 102
(2007) (explaining that the political process rationale for imposing a general grievance bar
is not always justified).
243. See Elliott, supra note 112 (distinguishing between an “undifferentiated interest” in
seeing the rule of law enforced and widespread yet particularized harm; for example, there
is a general right to clean air, but each of us experience dirty air in a “particularized and
concrete way”); cf. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“I agree that it
would exceed [Article III] limitations if, at the behest of Congress and in the absence of
any showing of concrete injury, we were to entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public’s
nonconcreto [sic] interest in the proper administration of the laws.”).
244. Cf. Nichol, supra note 12, at 318–19 (observing that attempts to distinguish between
cognizable widely shared injuries and purely political ones is “debating injury on the head
of a pin”).
245. Cf. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 491 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the “personal stake”
requirement as having “two essential components,” a “distinct and palpable injury” and
“some causal connection”(internal quotation marks omitted)).
246. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007).
247. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 186 (2000).
248. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997).
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the “slow[ing] or reduc[tion]”249 of the harm alleged in public law
cases. The Court should affirmatively adopt one of these formulations
in crafting a definitive public law model of adjudication.250
C. Congress Says So
Third, the Massachusetts majority identified a strong connection
between Congress’s creation of statutory rights and the judiciary’s purview over cases like Massachusetts. The Court deemed “of critical importance” the fact that “Congress has . . . authorized this type of
challenge to EPA action,”251 and further observed that “[t]he parties’
dispute turns on the proper construction of a congressional statute, a
question eminently suitable to resolution in federal court.”252 Federal
courts, in other words, construe federal legislation all the time. Marbury v. Madison253 secured the federal judiciary’s power to review the
actions taken by the non-judicial branches and, in doing so, to “say
what the law is.”254 In drawing a comparison between this proper dispute and those that are improper as a matter of the case-or-controversy
requirement (for example, adjudication of a political question, a request for an advisory opinion, or adjudication of a mooted question),
the Court suggested that the eminently “judicial” task prompted by a
lawsuit seeking construction of a statute comports with a finding of
Article III standing.255 Massachusetts thus affirmed that a plaintiff’s assertion of a concrete or personal stake in a case seeking to enforce
statutory procedures is enhanced if Congress legislatively authorized
the lawsuit.256
249. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1458 (emphasis omitted).
250. See generally supra notes 179–183 and accompanying text (discussing the Massachusetts Court’s approach to the redressability prong of the injury-in-fact analysis). As Susan
Bandes has observed, “causation is a concept inherently incapable of acting as a bright
line. It is by nature a continuum. The crucial task the Court has avoided is justifying why it
draws the line where it does, i.e., what it considers to be the requisites of a constitutional
case.” Bandes, supra note 78, at 270. She adds, however, that “[c]hoices about access
based on value preferences are an unavoidable part of jurisdictional decisions, not a new
slippery slope which can be avoided by adherence to the private rights model.” Id. at 299;
see also Elliott, supra note 112 (stating that a “practical link” is all that redressability usually
requires); Sunstein, Standing and Privatization, supra note 12, at 1459 (observing that the
Court’s causation decisions “are informed by norms of separation of powers, quite apart
from ideas about causation”).
251. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000)).
252. Id.
253. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
254. Id. at 177–78.
255. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1452.
256. Id. at 1453.
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Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has sent conflicting signals on
this issue. No Justice has taken the position that Congress lacks the
power to influence standing analysis. It is well established that Congress can create standing by creating statutory “injuries” unknown at
common law257 and that, if the generalized grievance bar is construed
as prudential, Congress can override it legislatively.258 But there is no
consensus as to whether Congress’s imprimatur on standing is constitutionally meaningful in public law cases that otherwise confound injury-in-fact analysis.259 If the generalized grievance bar is
constitutional, Lujan stands for the proposition that Congress cannot
bolster the plaintiffs’ necessary showing of particularized injury-in-fact
by authorizing the lawsuit.260 To Justice Scalia, the matter is fairly
straightforward. Injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability are required in all cases. Whether, even if those elements are satisfied,
courts might prudentially decline to hear the case because large segments of the population share undifferentiated harm is beside the
constitutional point. Congress can affect the latter inquiry, but not
the former.
Elsewhere, however, the Court has long acknowledged that Congress does influence the constitutional standing analysis. In Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, the Court found that “testers” who merely
posed as renters or home purchasers had standing to sue under the
Fair Housing Act in part because “Congress has . . . conferred on all
‘persons’ a legal right to truthful information about available hous257. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text; see also Bradford C. Mank, Standing
and Statistical Persons: Should Large Public Interest Organizations Have Greater Standing Rights
than Individuals?, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming 2009) (observing that notwithstanding
concerns about potential excessive congressional interference with executive discretion,
courts have recognized that Congress can authorize suits against the Executive Branch for
failing to implement legal requirements “so long as the plaintiff has suffered at least a
small concrete injury from the legal violation”).
258. See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text.
259. Cass Sunstein has argued prominently that “[a]s a general rule, the question for
purposes of standing is whether Congress has created a cause of action.” Sunstein, Standing and Privatization, supra note 12, at 1461; see also Sunstein, Informational Regulation, supra
note 49, at 642–43 (“[T]he principal question . . . for purposes of ‘injury in fact,’ is
whether Congress or any other source of law gives the litigant a right to bring suit.”).
260. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 566, 577 (1992) (stating that “[i]t
makes no difference” what Congress attempts to do by way of legislation when it comes to
Article III standing—the Constitution always requires injury-in-fact); see also id. at 580–81
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Court’s holding that there is an outer limit to the power
of Congress to confer rights of action is a direct and necessary consequence of the case and
controversy limitations found in Article III. I agree that it would exceed those limitations
if, at the behest of Congress and in the absence of any showing of concrete injury, we were
to entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public’s nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws.”).
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ing,” and such evidence of “congressional intention cannot be overlooked in determining . . . standing.”261 Dissenting from a finding of
taxpayer standing in Flast, Justice Harlan similarly opined that “litigants have standing to represent the public interest, despite their lack
of economic or other personal interests, if Congress has appropriately
authorized such suits.”262 In Akins, Justice Breyer considered widely
shared “informational injury” to be “sufficiently concrete and specific”
so as not to “deprive Congress of constitutional power to authorize its
vindication in the federal courts.”263 Concurring in Lujan, Justice
Kennedy expressed the view that Congress can legislate standing in a
way that alters the constitutional analysis so long as it is explicit in
defining injury and the chain of causation.264 And in Massachusetts,
Justice Stevens observed that congressional authorization of “this type
of challenge to EPA action” is “of critical importance to the standing
inquiry,” and went on to affirm the plaintiffs’ standing despite loud
protests from four colleagues that his analysis undermined the injuryin-fact standard as we know it.265
261. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373–74 (1982).
262. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 131 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). He added that
“[a]ny hazards to the proper allocation of authority among the three branches of the Government would be substantially diminished if public actions had been pertinently authorized by Congress and the President.” Id. at 131–32; cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
732, 739 (1972) (stating that standing depends in the first instance on whether that party
relies on a “specific statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process” but ultimately
holding that the Sierra Club lacked standing to challenge the construction of a ski resort
because “a mere ‘interest in a problem,’ no matter how longstanding the interest and no
matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by
itself to render the organization ‘adversely affected’ or ‘aggrieved’ within the meaning of
the APA”).
263. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1998).
264. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580.
265. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007). Massachusetts arguably did not
involve a citizen-suit provision per se, as in authorizing judicial review the CAA does not
expressly confer standing on any person or aggrieved party. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (addressing 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000)). This distinction may carry significance. In Bennett, for example, the Court found the “‘any person’ formulation” of the
ESA to be critical to the prudential standing analysis because it “applies to all . . . causes of
action,” and “not only to actions against private violators of environmental restrictions.”
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 166 (1997). Were the Massachusetts Court’s affirmation of
congressional power to confer standing in some measure to take a greater hold on the
Court’s standing jurisprudence, a related question would be what kind of statutory language is necessary to effectuate that power. In this regard, it bears mentioning that, although the APA authorizes any “person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute” to bring suit, that umbrella statute appears
to be unique. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). The “zone of interests” test initially developed as a
prudential gloss on standing in the APA context to make clear “that Congress, in enacting
§ 702, had not intended to allow suit by every person suffering injury in fact.” Clarke v.
Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 395 (1987) (discussing Ass’n of Data Processing Serv.
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The Court’s deference to congressional endorsements of standing draws upon historical notions of standing premised on the existence of a legal right to sue. Based on an Hohfeldian analysis,
Congress confers standing to sue whenever it creates a statutory
“right” or entitlement, authorizes judicial review for purposes of enforcing that right, and defines the ambit of potential plaintiffs.266
What differs from the Hohfeldian context under modern administrative law is that statutory rights do not always inure to the benefit of an
individual. When they benefit the public and Congress authorizes citizen suits to vindicate them, separation of powers problems arise as
courts attempt to apply the Lujan formulation of the injury-in-fact test.
The Massachusetts Court’s recognition of Congress’s power to impact
the standing analysis marks some distancing from the Lujan private
law model.
Proponents of the modern injury-in-fact test, such as Justice Scalia
and Chief Justice Roberts, would argue that the Constitution does not
empower Congress to define the jurisdiction of Article III courts in a
way that impinges on executive authority to take care that the laws are
enforced. Article III, however, says nothing about standing, the separation of powers, or limits on Congress’s ability to establish the boundaries of the case or controversy requirements of the Constitution.267
The Supreme Court has never adopted the theory, famously advanced

Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970), which held that “the interest[s] sought to be
protected by the complainant [be] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question”). In conjunction with the
APA’s passage, the Department of Justice explained that the statute’s judicial review provision was designed as “a general restatement of the principles of judicial review embodied
in many statutes and judicial decisions . . . [that] generally leaves the mechanics of judicial
review to be governed by other statutes.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 93 (1947). As such, the APA may not represent a congressional authorization of statutory standing that is commensurate with, say,
that of the FECA as construed by the Akins majority.
266. Louis Jaffe posited that the problem of suits by non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs “should
be solved in terms of formal legislative action taken to demonstrate the desire of a majority
for such judicial determination.” Jaffe, supra note 63, at 1044. An issue that arises here,
which I do not discuss in this paper, is the determination of congressional intent and the
extent to which the analysis parallels the zone of interest test for prudential standing.
267. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,”
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 178 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, What’s Standing]
(arguing that “[t]here is absolutely no affirmative evidence that Article III was intended to
limit congressional power to create standing” and that “[t]here is no affirmative evidence
of a requirement of a ‘personal stake’ or an ‘injury in fact’”); see also Raoul Berger, Standing
to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 835 (1969) (arguing that there is no historical or constitutional basis for the traditional separation of powers
theory of standing as protecting the political branches from undue judicial intrusion).
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by Justice Story in dictum in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,268 that if Congress decides to create federal courts pursuant to its express Article III
powers, it must vest in them some version of “the whole judicial
power.”269 By the same logic, the Constitution creates no immutable
ideal of “judicial Power” that cannot be refined by Congress as it defines the lower federal courts’ jurisdiction.
Nor, for that matter, does the Take Care Clause indicate that
Congress cannot enable private parties to sue the executive over statutory breaches.270 The Take Care Clause is an obligation imposed on
the President to give effect to the laws of the United States, including
those enacted by Congress—not a source of power or an unabridged
right that must be protected at all costs.271 The argument that any
“enforcement” of the laws by the judiciary overrides the executive prerogative also ignores the porous nature of the walls separating the
branches in numerous other areas.272 The ordinary work of the Judiciary includes ensuring that the executive branch fulfills its constitu268. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). Scholars have advanced similar theories. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 206, 210 (1985) (arguing that Article III, § 2’s reference to
“all” cases indicates that jurisdiction must exist in some federal court for all cases arising
under federal law).
269. See Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. at 328–39 (interpreting the Constitution as requiring
that Congress vest the authority to hear all cases and controversies in federal courts).
270. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
271. See Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to be Done: An Essay on Marbury
v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 253, 275 (2003) (describing the Take Care Clause as imposing a duty rather than as
conferring power); Sunstein, Standing and Privatization, supra note 12, at 1471 (“If administrative action is legally inadequate or if the agency has violated the law by failing to act at
all, there is no usurpation of executive prerogatives in a judicial decision to that effect.
Such a decision is necessary in order to vindicate congressional directives, as part of the
judicial function ‘to say what the law is.’” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803))).
272. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.
It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 140 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966) (suggesting that the separation of powers only prevents the “whole power of one department”
from falling into the hands of an official or institution that also exercises the “whole
power” of another department); Berger, supra note 267, at 828 (discussing Madison’s reference to a necessary “blending” of powers); Chayes, supra note 13, at 1307 (observing that
“[i]n practice, all governmental officials, including judges, have exercised a large and
messy admixture of powers”). But see Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of
the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
8–9 (1994) (advocating a formalist approach to separation of powers that would permit
“[n]o commingling of legislative, executive, or judicial power . . . except where specifically
provided in the constitutional text” and implying that such a model would not harmonize
with the current administrative state).
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tional duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.273
Although Congress’s power is not unlimited—it may not enable federal courts to issue advisory opinions,274 for example—it is generally
“undisputed” that Congress can “create interests sufficient to confer
the personal stake demanded by access standing.”275 As Jonathan
Siegel has observed, “Justice Scalia’s own preference for majoritarian
decision making suggests that courts should respect Congress’s desire
and permit Congress to enable any citizen to demand implementation
of the statutory scheme.”276 In recognizing standing where Congress
has authorized standing to sue to enforce a statute, courts carry out
the majority’s will.277 Congress certainly has the power to limit who
can sue.278 Given that the particularized injury requirement does not
coherently identify those grievances that are so generalized as to justify disregarding congressional authorizations to sue, the better view is
to look to congressional intent in determining whether a particular
statutory enforcement case may be resolved in the courts.279
IV.

FINALLY: AN EMERGING PUBLIC LAW MODEL

OF

STANDING

The approach to standing in statutory enforcement cases that I
derive from Massachusetts has several advantages. First, it does away
with the uncertain specter of the generalized grievance bar for cases
involving widespread harm, confining it to the purely ideological citizen or taxpayer disgruntled with the operation of government. Sec273. Siegel, supra note 242, at 100.
274. Nichol, supra note 79, at 91–92 (citing Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346
(1911)); see also Logan, supra note 241, at 61 & n.99, 62 (arguing that courts should defer
to congressional authorizations of standing and noting possible limits on congressional
power to do so).
275. Nichol, supra note 79, at 92; see also Siegel, supra note 242, at 105–06, 127 (arguing
that Congress can authorize courts to redress widely shared injuries because it can statutorily create rights and qui tam actions give it “an effectively unlimited ability to create general public standing to enforce federal law”).
276. Id. at 104.
277. See Chayes, supra note 13, at 1314 (adding that “the legitimacy of judicial action can
be understood to rest on a delegation from the people’s representatives”).
278. See Siegel, supra note 242, at 103 (stating that Congress can limit by statute the set
of potential plaintiffs who can challenge government action).
279. See Pierce, supra note 237, at 1181, 1192, 1201 (arguing that Congress can confer
standing legislatively and that courts should enforce its policy decisions against agencies);
Sunstein, What’s Standing, supra note 267, at 223 (arguing that Congress’s grant of standing
in Lujan should have resolved the issue); Sunstein, Standing and Privatization, supra note 12,
at 1433 (arguing that the “principal question” for standing “should be whether Congress
has created a cause of action”). But see Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen
Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1794 (1993) (arguing that “Article II prohibits Congress from vesting in private parties the power to bring enforcement actions on
behalf of the public without allowing for sufficient executive control over the litigation”).
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ond, as Massachusetts makes clear, a majority of sitting Justices agree
that congressional approval of standing is meaningful in the constitutional analysis and that procedural rights are special in standing analysis; therefore, a robust commitment to these factors in public law
standing analysis is a realistic goal.
In this Part, I address two more plusses. The first is the framework’s accommodation of what has been for too long ignored: the
concept of surrogate standing, which is necessitated by the rise of the
administrative state, and which Lujan’s private law model cannot adjust for. Rather than pay lip service to Lujan, the alternative approach
proposed here would bring above ground for scrutiny and debate an
analysis that has already been selectively applied in public law cases
under the guise of injury-in-fact.280 Second, it does away with the flipside of the Lujan Court’s separation of powers concern—circumscribing citizen-standing statutes for lack of particularized injury-in-fact—
and serves a purpose of separation of powers that the injury-in-fact’s
monolithic emphasis on executive autonomy does not: checking and
balancing power.
A. A Reconceptualized Model Applied
In this Subpart, I revisit my opening hypothetical to show how
application of the three revised criteria that I derive from Massachusetts—a statutory authorization, a procedural injury, and a concrete
stake—interact to present a picture of public law standing that offers
more clarity than the injury-in-fact and its adjectives can accommodate. To be sure, this approach liberalizes standing to enable Bear
Friends to sue without producing a member who regularly visits the
affected bear habitats. But it does so at Congress’s behest, and with
greater transparency than the injury-in-fact test requires.
Bear Friends’ claims that the Secretary impermissibly failed to
consult with the FWS, and that the FWS failed to prepare a biological
opinion under the ESA, constitute procedural injuries that would trigger a relaxed redressability analysis, but only so long as the plaintiff
simultaneously demonstrates a concrete stake in the case. Although
the deprivation of information about the effects of an increased cattle
population on grizzlies that would presumably appear in a biological
opinion does not satisfy the adjectives, it constitutes the kind of concrete stake that the Court expressly recognized in Akins. The group’s
280. See Bandes, supra note 78, at 294–95 (arguing that judicial precedent narrows the
scope of discretion and renders the decisionmaking process more democratic by permitting public scrutiny of the Court’s choices).

R

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\mlr104.txt

2008]

unknown

Seq: 57

JUSTICIABLE GENERALIZED GRIEVANCES

25-NOV-08

13:45

277

concern that its raison d’être—preservation of grizzly bears—is jeopardized by the agency’s action further works a perceptible effect on the
plaintiff that distinguishes Bear Friends from the general population.
Although both harms are felt by a broader population, they relate specifically to this organization’s function and purpose; together these
“stakes” signal more than the abstract injury to ideology that the Court
has consistently rejected as non-justiciable.281 Lastly, the ESA authorizes citizen-suits such as this one—a congressional stamp of approval
that the majority deemed “important” in Massachusetts and that operates to stem what could be a flood of public law claims challenging
procedural irregularities on limitless theories of a cognizable “stake.”
The framework derived from Massachusetts is hardly unassailable,
or devoid of opportunities for subjectivity and manipulable line-drawing. But it provides an important step toward moving through the
quagmire that cases like Lujan created by reinserting private law theory into the public law realm. The approach’s gentler and more realistic application of redressability for procedural plaintiffs, as well as its
detachment from a misunderstanding of particularized injury as requiring harm that is unique and differentiated, is sensible given the
diffuse and non-linear effects that an increasingly bureaucratized government has on society. And, as I have noted previously, concerns
over undue judicial influence on executive prerogative may be addressed at the merits stage of litigation by virtue of the deferential
standards governing judicial review of executive action.282 Theoretically, moreover, rendering standing more available with congressional
authorization serves an important separation of powers function that
the prevailing test ignores.
B. Reconciliation and Justification
Akins and Massachusetts demonstrate that the Court has declined
to consistently uphold the Lujan Court’s Article II objective in statutory enforcement cases. This may be, as others have suggested,283 be281. Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 583 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (opining that “[i]f respondents are genuinely interested in the preservation of the
endangered species and intend to study . . . these animals in the future, their injury will
occur as soon as the animals are destroyed”).
282. See Brown, supra note 18, at 724–28; see also Siegel, supra note 242, at 125 (“If we
had no doctrines of justiciability whatsoever, the courts would still play only a proper, and
properly limited, role in our democratic society, so long as they confined themselves to
enforcing legal constraints on executive and congressional action.”).
283. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 78, at 277–78 (discussing what she calls “the ‘checks
and balances’ model” of separation of powers); Elliott, supra note 112 (calling a lawsuit “a
brake on runaway agencies” in service of separation of powers).
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cause the prevailing separation of powers justification for standing is
wrongly confined to protection of the executive from judicial interference.284 When the Court perceives commonly-shared harms as substantial and susceptible to evading redress because the executive has
failed to act, it may hear them.285 The framework I identify for analyzing standing in statutory enforcement cases captures this “checks-andbalances” concept without giving courts unfettered discretion to decide when the executive has gone too far in abdicating its obligations
to enforce the law. It assumes that, by authorizing a lawsuit, Congress
has acted as the people’s representatives in determining that judicial
enforcement is appropriate and even necessary. This balancing of
constitutional power does not unlawfully demean the executive
branch. It maintains that the executive prerogative enjoys no superior
protection than the protections afforded the other branches in the
separation of powers scheme.286
In the two contexts highlighted in this paper—cases brought
under environmental statutes and those brought under federal campaign finance and election laws—the Lujan formulation of injury-infact overcorrects for judicial interference with the democratic process.287 Once an election is over and the winning candidate is in of284. I am not purporting to undertake a full analysis of the Court’s view of separation of
powers here. For more on the separation of powers issue, see, for example, Pushaw, supra
note 66, at 396, 472, 483, 489 (arguing, among other things, that justiciability undermines
separation of powers by restricting judicial review). See also Logan, supra note 241, at 61–63
& n.108 (arguing that separation of powers concerns warrant describing deference to congressional decisions regarding justiciability).
285. Although there is disconnect between statutory enforcement cases and constitutional ones, it is not my objective to fully account for the latter in this paper. Susan Bandes
has argued persuasively that the definition of a case under Article III should be guided in
the first instance by the federal courts’ primary role of upholding the Constitution. See
Bandes, supra note 78, at 277; see also Nichol, supra note 79, at 78 (observing that, under
current practice, rights that the Framers considered sufficiently important to put in the
Constitution are least likely to be found cognizable). Acceptance of her position would
warrant unraveling the case law leading up to Hein to similarly enable judicial review of
failures of the political branches to uphold the Constitution. Carl Esbeck has recently
characterized Flast as creating a “legal fiction” necessitated by the fact that without taxpayer
standing under Flast, no plaintiff would have standing to challenge a law which “strikes at
the core of the American church-state settlement.” Carl H. Esbeck, What the Hein Decision
Can Tell Us about the Roberts Court and The Establishment Clause, 78 MISS. L.J. (forthcoming
2008).
286. Indeed, Robert Pushaw has persuasively argued that the overriding goal of the
Founders’ approach to separation of powers was to prevent tyranny and that it informed
the early Court’s ideas of justiciability. Pushaw, supra note 66, at 451.
287. The Court has wrestled with the generalized grievance bar in another notable context: public housing cases. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (discussing Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982)); see also Logan, supra note 241, at 54–66
(discussing the Court’s decisions in Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separa-
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fice, the loser’s injury—a failed election—is not likely to be redressed
by an order directing a third party to comply with the FECA. A voter’s
inability to make a fully informed choice cannot be remedied because
the election is over. Had the Akins Court not seized on the lack of
information to find standing and glossed over particularization and
redressability problems,288 no plaintiff could sue to enforce the FECA
in federal court, despite a citizen-suit provision reflecting a congressional determination that leaving enforcement of the FECA exclusively to the FEC is inadequate.289 The Court has repeatedly
emphasized the indispensable role that campaign and finance laws
play in a functioning democracy.290 The FEC has been roundly criticized as ineffective in carrying out its important mission,291 with the
Supreme Court deriding it for subverting the federal election and
campaign finance laws that it is charged with enforcing.292 Congress
enabled judicial intervention via citizen suits to ensure executive compliance with the rule of law. The statute reflects a legislative judgment
of a heightened need for executive accountability regarding enforcement of critical legislation designed to facilitate a fair election
system.293
A majority of the Court appears to view global warming as similarly justifying a model of justiciability that enables litigation to supplement politics. In Massachusetts, the majority explained that,
“[n]otwithstanding the serious character of th[e] jurisdictional argument . . . the unusual importance of the underlying issue persuaded
us to grant the writ.”294 The impact of climate change is diffuse, with
tion of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91 (1979); and Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972)).
288. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23–25 (1998), for the Court’s discussion of particularized injury and redressability.
289. Note that the Court has tolerated this result in the context of constitutional enforcement cases. See Bandes, supra note 78, at 267 (“In Schlesinger and Richardson . . . the
Court denied standing despite its recognition that no better plaintiff was likely to exist and
that the issue might therefore never be litigated.” (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974))).
290. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (describing “profound national
commitment” to open debate over candidates); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964) (characterizing the right to “public discussion” as constitutionally moored).
291. See generally Brown, supra note 18, at 708–15 (describing the widespread criticism of
the FEC’s shortcomings, and the congressional responses thereto).
292. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 142–44 (2003) (explaining that the FEC’s regulatory regime permitted the use of soft money in election campaigns and describing the
corruption associated with soft money contributions).
293. See Jaffe, supra note 63, at 1046 (“[I]f there is to be judicial protection of the individual from the impact of . . . unconstitutional exercises of power, it may be that an action
by a plaintiff whose credentials are something less than traditional must be allowed.”).
294. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1447 (2007).
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effects that are insidious and imperceptible but dangerously irreversible. The ideally injured plaintiff who can satisfy the prevailing adjectives may not surface until it is too late to reverse compounding
adverse effects on the planet. Although a number of statutes and treaties were in place to address climate change when Massachusetts was
decided,295 the Court perceived that Congress—through the CAA—
required more of the executive branch. The EPA had refused to read
the statutory mandate that it regulate “vehicles [that contribute to] air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare”296 as covering substances that contribute to global
warming.297 The Court could have declined to hear the case on standing grounds and waited for Congress to amend the statute to expressly
cover new auto emissions. It instead found standing to hear a case
that culminated in a judicial condemnation of the EPA for “refus[ing]
to comply with this clear statutory command.”298
This outcome recognizes that lawsuits serve another separation of
powers function: ensuring that the executive branch enforces federal
statutes and promulgates rules consistent with them notwithstanding
political tampering from the White House.299 As Jody Freeman and
295. Congress passed two statutes addressing climate change before 1990, when it last
comprehensively amended the Clean Air Act. See National Climate Program Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-367, § 3, 92 Stat. 601, 601 (1978) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2902 (2006)) (requiring
President to establish a program to “assist the Nation and the world to understand and
respond to natural and man-induced climate processes and their implications”); Global
Climate Protection Act of 1987, Title XI of Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 1103(b), 101 Stat. 1407,
1408 (1987) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2901 note (2006)) (directing EPA to propose to Congress a “coordinated national policy on global climate change”); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2703 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7403(g)(1) & 7671a(e) (2000)). The United States also signed the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), a nonbinding agreement
among 154 nations to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102–38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107,
but did not ratify the UNFCCC protocol adopted in Kyoto for assigning mandatory targets
for reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (as passed by Senate, July 25, 1997). For a description of the legislative history related to global warming,
see Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1447–50.
296. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
297. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1450.
298. Id. at 1462.
299. See Donald L. Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights,
and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 96 (1985) (advocating recognition of collectively shared interests in standing doctrine as necessary to correct government lawlessness, as “[w]hen government violates the Constitution, the stake in the
outcome of the controversy is society’s stake, and is the most fundamental interest possible:
the interest in government functioning as agreed upon by its creators”); Ann Woolhandler,
Treaties, Self-Execution, and the Public Law Litigation Model, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 757, 781 (2002)
(noting that the public law “expansion of standing and duty was in the service of assuring
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Adrian Vermeule recently suggested, Massachusetts “is best understood
not so much as an environmental case,” but as an “episode[ ] in which
Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy have joined forces to override executive positions that they found untrustworthy, in the sense that executive expertise had been subordinated to politics.”300
There are two readily apparent criticisms of this checks-and-balances function of standing. First, it compromises executive authority
to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, including the ability
to ignore statutory obligations where it deems it appropriate. Second,
it aggrandizes judicial power at the expense of the other branches.
The first critique begs the question of whether standing doctrine is
properly monopolized by Justice Scalia’s theory of separation of powers as operating to protect against improvident judicial intrusion into
the prerogative of the executive branch.301 Although important, this
theory proves too much. In other areas of agency law, the Court has
recognized that traditional rules of judicial engagement do not apply
if the executive abjures its authority. Under Heckler v. Chaney,302 an
agency’s abdication of its authority is a basis for review of a non-enforcement decision that is otherwise immune from judicial review;
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the decision of whether courts
are the most appropriate body to police the failure of an agency to
carry out its designated powers “is in the first instance for Congress.”303 If Congress has authorized judicial review, Article II should
similarly present no independent barrier to federal jurisdiction.304
governmental compliance with domestic law, and thus reinforced the presumptive justiciability of duties to comply with the Constitution and statutes”).
300. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise,
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52.
301. See Bandes, supra note 78, at 277 (noting that “the Court subscribes to a highly
particularized and controversial vision of the separation of powers and fails to acknowledge
that any alternative vision exists”); see generally Scalia, supra note 82 (arguing that standing
protects the separation of powers).
302. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
303. Id. at 834.
304. In Laidlaw, the majority noted the separation of powers objections to finding standing, but ultimately rejected them as “overdrawn” on the facts. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 188 n.4 (2000). The Department of Justice
had “endorsed this citizen suit from the outset,” the “Federal Government retain[ed] the
power to foreclose a citizen suit by undertaking its own action” under the Clean Water Act,
and “if the Executive Branch opposes a particular citizen suit, the statute allows the Administrator of the EPA to ‘intervene as a matter of right’ and bring the Government’s views to
the attention of the court.” Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (2000) and quoting 33
U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) (2000)). Rather than reject Congress’s power to enable standing outright, the Court found some invasion of the executive prerogative permissible, as if it were
applying a sliding scale for standing in the public law context, with gradations that depend
on the nature of the public injury in question and the specific language of the statute. Of
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Executive power, after all, is not unlimited. In Marbury v.
Madison, Chief Justice Marshall identified fundamental constraints on
the executive’s ability to flout the commands of Congress and avoid
lawful process of the courts.305 Congress is vested with the power to
make all laws “necessary and proper” to carry into execution its full
legislative powers, and with “all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.”306 It also approves officers nominated by the President.307 Mary Cheh has argued, therefore, that executive officials can
be ordered by Congress to perform certain functions and duties “without interference even from the [P]resident of the United States.”308
Justice Souter pointed out in Hein that “there is no difference” on the
point of separation of powers “between a Judicial Branch review of an
executive decision and a judicial evaluation of a congressional
one.”309 The executive, in other words, enjoys no special treatment
when it comes to separation of power protections, and has no constitutional authority to violate the law.310 Just as the legislature may give
the executive certain prerogatives to deal with unforeseen circumstances—either by regulation, adjudication, or informal agency action—it can make a determination that the executive should be
course, Lujan was also an environmental case, but it did not implicate the abdication by the
executive of its enforcement obligations in the same way that Massachusetts and Akins did.
It involved a challenge to a legislative rule implementing a statute pursuant to delegated
authority, rather than agency nonenforcement of existing law. See Cheh, supra note 271, at
285 (describing Chief Justice Marshall’s approach to judicial review in Marbury as contemplating close scrutiny of executive inaction “if there was a pattern of inaction, or some
evidence of impermissible purposes as disclosed by a departure from prior norms, irregular procedures, or improper political influence”).
305. See Cheh, supra note 271, at 257–59 (explaining that Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury “is still a powerful exposition on the limits of executive power and the
judiciary’s power and duty to enforce those limits”).
306. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8, cl. 18.
307. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
308. Cheh, supra note 271, at 261.
309. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2586 (2007) (Souter,
J., dissenting). Justice Souter contrasted the Court’s decision in Flast v. Cohen—which authorized an Establishment Clause challenge to congressional appropriations—with the
Hein plurality’s refusal to apply Flast because it involved executive versus congressional expenditures. Justice Souter wrote, “if the Executive could accomplish through the exercise
of discretion exactly what Congress cannot do through legislation, Establishment Clause
protection would melt away.” Id. at 2585–86.
310. See generally Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 53 (1849) (observing that federal
courts have jurisdiction to ensure that the executive does not violate the Constitution or
laws); cf. Berger, supra note 267, at 829 (arguing that courts may decide whether a “legislative usurpation” has occurred, even if they cannot legislate, and that a “legislative usurpation does not change character when it is challenged by a stranger”).
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accountable to the people as a whole for its exercise of that delegated
authority.311
Moreover, if Congress provides for judicial review, the ensuing
judicial function of ensuring that the executive does not abdicate its
enforcement obligations is properly within the province of the federal
courts. To quote Mary Cheh, “[e]ven in the face of modern translation difficulties . . . Marbury’s core message remains clear and powerful: pursuant to constitutional and statutory commands, the executive
has the obligation to act within the law, and the courts have the duty
to enforce the law.”312 And as Massachusetts reaffirmed, the proper
construction of a statute is something “eminently suitable to resolution in federal court.”313 The constitutional requirement that the executive “faithfully” execute the laws314 suggests an objective, externally
enforceable meaning of the executive branch’s duty.
The inter-branch fight triggered by generalized grievance cases is
really between Congress and the executive, not the executive and the
courts.315 If Justice Scalia is correct, and standing should strictly operate to shield the executive from judicial review notwithstanding congressional intent, laws passed by a democratically elected branch
could simply go unenforced. The Court long ago rejected the argument that the President may direct an executive official to refuse to
carry out congressionally prescribed duties.316 Mary Cheh has observed that such a principle, “if carried out in its results . . . would be
clothing the President with a power entirely to control the legislation
of [C]ongress, and paralyze the administration of justice.”317 Once
the President has signed a bill into law (or his veto has been overridden), he is hard-pressed to justify a refusal to enforce the law as an
311. Cf. Doernberg, supra note 299, at 63–64 (discussing John Locke’s theory of government as the product of a compact, with the government-as-trustee obligated to the people
and not vice versa).
312. Cheh, supra note 271, at 255.
313. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007).
314. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed . . . .”).
315. Cheh, supra note 271, at 265.
316. See Cheh, supra note 271, at 260–61 (discussing Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 524, 612–13 (1838), which rejected the argument that the President could order
an executive official not to carry out duties delegated by Congress).
317. See Cheh, supra note 271, at 260–61 (quoting Kendall, 37 U.S. at 613). I do not
attempt in this Article to delve into the vast body of literature debating the theory of a
“unitary executive,” which perceives the President as having the final word on the exercise
of all executive authority, regardless of contrary congressional intent. See, e.g., David M.
Driesen, Firing U.S. Attorneys: An Essay, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 707, 708 (2008) (“[T]he unitary
executive theory . . . maintains that the President’s Article II power to execute the law gives
him the right to control all other officers who have law enforcement responsibilities.”).
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executive prerogative. This is particularly so if the decision to ignore
a statute is undertaken by a constitutionally anomalous government
agency. Justice Scalia’s answer to this dilemma is that it is a “good
thing,” because “[y]esterday’s herald is today’s bore”; the federal bureaucracy’s failure to enforce certain laws, in other words, may signal
that social change is needed.318 Justice Alito similarly commented in
Hein that “[i]n the unlikely event” that “a parade of horribles” by the
executive were to occur without judicial review, “Congress could
quickly step in” and fix it legislatively.319
But the answer that Congress can enact a statute directing the
executive to comply with a preexisting statute is unsatisfying. Not only
is the majoritarian process frustrated320 when the executive does not
enforce the law, and served when courts require adherence to legislation that survived the hurdles of bicameralism and presentment,321 an
executive branch content with pushing the boundaries of the law may
not be receptive towards additional congressional directives aimed at
checking executive overreaching. In practice, moreover, the expectation that Congress and the executive branch will simply work these
problems out is unrealistic.322 The very existence of broad delegations of authority to administrative agencies demonstrates Congress’s
inability to manage the minutiae of its own legislation, and the concomitant need for judicial supervision of the executive, which cannot
be expected to police itself.323 Yet ironically, the private law model
produces the bizarre effect of narrowing judicial oversight as the
bureaucratization of government—and the accompanying power assigned to agencies—increases.324 And as others have observed, gener318. See Scalia, supra note 82, at 897.
319. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2586, 2571 (2007)
(plurality opinion).
320. As Abram Chayes has pointed out, however, laws are subject to minority veto, so “to
retreat to the notion that the legislature itself—Congress!—is in some mystical way adequately representative of all the interests at stake . . . is to impose democratic theory by
brute force on observed institutional behavior.” Chayes, supra note 13, at 1311.
321. Louis Jaffe observed that citizen-suit provisions “enable citizen groups to participate in the decision-making process,” in which individual citizens often feel excluded from
“the vast, multitudinous complexes” of government. Jaffe, supra note 63, at 1044. He saw
“[t]he judicial process as a vehicle for self-government,” and “[t]he usual taxpayer and
citizen suit [a]s thoroughly consistent with the primacy of majority rule.” Id. at 1045.
“The issue,” he wrote, “will be the statutory authority of the official action, and the lawsuit
itself will be prescribed by statute.” Id.
322. See generally Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
61 (2006) (discussing the various ways that Congress can influence the executive branch).
323. See Cheh, supra note 271, at 264 (“Congress’s broad powers of oversight [are] simply inadequate to insure agency fidelity to statutory dictates.”).
324. See generally Bandes, supra note 78, at 296 n.473 (discussing the substantive criticisms of the private law model).
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alized grievances are precisely the kind of injuries that the political
process is unlikely to rectify, as slightly or identically harmed parties
would have little incentive to mobilize politically because of “freerider” problems.325
The time has come, therefore, for the Court to expressly reconceptualize particularized injury-in-fact in statutory enforcement cases
and embrace a public law model derived from one or more principles
that Massachusetts and Akins offer.326 Although a new model is susceptible to subjectivity and malleability, this critique would apply to much
of what the Supreme Court does. The vagaries of “standards” as distinct from the predictability of “rules” exist by necessity, to enable
judges to take into account unforeseen and nuanced circumstances
and produce a fair result. Judicial discretion is inevitable in applying
constitutional principles, and courts can handle such authority. It is,
indeed, “[t]he unprincipled and unarticulated use of that discretion”327 that is troubling.
V. CONCLUSION
Standing was initially conceived as a means of ensuring that a
case was sufficiently adversarial to create good judicial decisionmaking. Later, with the advent of the administrative state and the concept
of “surrogate standing” in public law cases, a theory of standing as a
means of enforcing the separation of powers gave birth to the modern
injury-in-fact test. The Court has had trouble applying that test consistently in public law cases that are not moored in the common law
causes of action that historically defined justiciable injury. Massachusetts v. EPA, although resolved ostensibly on the basis of a “special so325. See Siegel, supra note 242, at 102 (discussing the limits of relying on the political
process to resolve widespread harms); see also Elliott, supra note 112 (noting the benefit of
having federal courts resolve widespread yet particularized harms in the context of contemporary mass tort and class action cases).
326. Numerous commentators have argued for adoption of a public rights model of
justiciability. See Bandes, supra note 78, at 299 (“The Court’s access determinations,
though rooted in the private law tradition, increasingly reflect acceptance of the public law
model [and] suggest that [the model] is workable and contains principles of limitation.”);
Siegel, supra note 242, at 122–23 (arguing that, despite the private rights theory of justiciability, in “the real world . . . courts do have the special function of . . . ensuring that
government behaves lawfully”); Woolhandler, supra note 299, at 780 (suggesting that the
focus of standing has effectively become the breach by the government defendant, “rather
than the injury to the plaintiff”). But cf. Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending—The
Role of Legal and Equitable Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 2–3, 6 (2001) (arguing that creation
of a public law model of standing is unnecessary because legal and equitable principles
that apply to state courts of general jurisdiction can accommodate Article III
requirements).
327. Bandes, supra note 78, at 302.
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licitude” exception for states’ standing, refused to apply the bar on
generalized grievances to an attempt to prompt the EPA to stall global
warming by regulating new car emissions, and gave short shrift to the
“adjectives” affixed to the traditional injury-in-fact test. The Court indicated that standing, at bottom, seeks to ensure the presence of a
precursor to injury-in-fact—the concrete or personal stake—and that
congressional authorization of standing carries constitutional weight.
In this Article, I highlighted the broader implications of Massachusetts for public law standing doctrine, and proposed that the Court
embrace an alternative framework for statutory enforcement cases
based on three characteristics drawn from the majority opinion: (1)
the plaintiff’s invocation of “procedural rights” established by statute;
(2) a “concrete” and “personal” stake that distinguishes the plaintiff
from the pure ideologue; and (3) a congressional authorization of the
suit. This framework has numerous advantages to injury-in-fact in the
public law context. It removes what has become a formalistic pretense
and unveils a shadow standard that, by necessity, is more attuned to
the disparate effects of government decisionmaking. Additionally, it
clarifies the scope of the misunderstood generalized grievance bar in
statutory cases, confining it to its original purpose of precluding judicial review claims raising ideological challenges to agency action or
inaction. Indeed, its premises have already garnered a majority of
support from the sitting Justices, and would thus not require full-scale
reconstruction of the law of standing, as other commentators have
suggested. Furthermore, it gives due weight to congressional judgments about required process. And it serves the checks-and-balances
purpose of the separation of powers, namely, ensuring executive accountability to the public and the other branches of government.

